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Article
The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?
NGOZI OKIDEGBE
Jurisdictions are increasingly embracing the use of pretrial risk assessment
algorithms as a solution to the problem of mass pretrial incarceration.
Conversations about the use of pretrial algorithms in legal scholarship have tended
to focus on their opacity, determinativeness, reliability, validity, or their (in)ability
to reduce high rates of incarceration, as well as racial and socioeconomic
disparities within the pretrial system. This Article breaks from this tendency,
examining these algorithms from a democratization of criminal law perspective.
Using this framework, it points out that currently employed algorithms are
exclusionary of the viewpoints and values of the racially marginalized communities
most impacted by their usage, since these algorithms are often procured, adopted,
constructed, and overseen without input from these communities.
This state of affairs should caution enthusiasm for the transformative potential
of pretrial algorithms since they reinforce and entrench the democratic exclusion
that members from these communities already experience in the creation and
implementation of the laws and policies shaping pretrial practices. This democratic
exclusion, alongside social marginalization, contributes to the difficulties that these
communities face in contesting and resisting the political, social, and economic
costs that pretrial incarceration has had and continues to have on them. Ultimately,
this Article stresses that resolving this democratic exclusion and its racially
stratifying effects might be possible but requires shifting power over pretrial
algorithms toward these communities. Unfortunately, the actualization of this
prescription may be unreconcilable with the aims sought by algorithm reformers,
revealing a deep tension between the algorithm project and racial justice efforts.
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The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?
NGOZI OKIDEGBE *
INTRODUCTION
Bail decisions are among the most consequential decisions in our
criminal legal system.1 Their outcomes can lead to short-term or long-term
incarceration before trial, enacting hardships on defendants, their families,
and their communities.2 Today, bail decisions are increasingly informed by
pretrial algorithms that utilize an actuarial method and information about the
defendant to determine the likelihood that the defendant will fail to appear

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I appreciate the helpful
feedback and support I received from Michelle Adams, Ifeoma Ajunwa, Deborah N. Archer, David Ball,
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Philip Brink, Christopher
J. Buccafusco, Bennett Capers, Jenny Carroll, Carliss Chatman, Erin Collins, Rebecca Crootof, Pooja R.
Dadhania, Jessica Eaglin, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Barry Friedman, Fareed Nassor Hayat, Michael
Eric Herz, Margaret Hu, Lolita Buckner Inniss, Myriam Gilles, Maeve Glass, Cynthia Godsoe, Lauryn
P. Gouldin, Tristin Green, Ben Grunwald, Nikolas Guggenberger, Osamudia James, Olatunde C.
Johnson, Benjamin Levin, Kate Levine, Chief Judge Debra Ann Livingston, Rachel E. López, James A.
Macleod, Sandra Mayson, Ion Meyn, Colin Miller, Kathryn Miller, Jamelia Morgan, Justin Murray,
Prianka Nair, Lindsay Nash, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Manish Oza, Najarian Peters, Michael Pollack,
Alice Ristroph, Anna Roberts, Leticia Saucedo, Paul Shechtman, Jocelyn Simonson, Christopher
Slobogin, Abbe Smith, Charisa Kiyô Smith, Ji Seon Song, Vincent M. Southerland, Edward Stein,
Stewart Sterk, Kendall Thomas, I. India Thusi, Matt Wansley, Sam Weinstein, Kate Weisburd, Rebecca
Wexler, Patricia Williams, Colin D.C. Wood, Felix Wu, Charles M. Yablon, and Ekow Yankah. This
Article benefited greatly from presentations and discussions at the 2019 Lutie A. Lytle Black Women
Law Faculty Workshop, CrimFest 2019, the Cardozo Faculty Workshop, 2019 LatCrit Biennial
Conference, the 2020 Women of Color Collective Junior Legal Scholars Workshop, 2020 Junior Law &
Tech Workshop, 2020 ABA-AALS Criminal Justice section academic roundtables, the Nebraska
Governance and Technology Center’s Law & Technology’s Virtual Workshop, and the 2020
Decarceration Law Profs Virtual Works-in-Progress Series. I would also like to thank the editors of the
Connecticut Law Review for their hard work and helpful edits.
1
Ellen A. Donnelly & John M. MacDonald, The Downstream Effects of Bail and Pretrial Detention
on Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 778 (2018)
(“Determinations of bail and detention before trial are crucial decisions that are made before final court
dispositions.”); Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 960 (2020)
(“The consequences of being held in pretrial detention—even for a misdemeanor—can be significant.”).
2
Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–14 (2017) (“This expansive system of
pretrial detention has profound consequences both within and beyond the criminal justice system. A
person detained for even a few days may lose her job, housing, or custody of her children. . . . [Those
who are detained are also at risk of being] convicted more frequently, receiv[ing] longer sentences, and
commit[ting] more future crimes than those who are not [detained before trial] (on average).”); Crystal
S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1417 (2017) (“The private and social
costs of pre-trial detention fall into five main categories: loss of freedom, wrongful conviction, future
costs associated with the collateral consequences of detention, externalities on other members of society,
and finally the administrative costs of jails.”).
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or be arrested for a pretrial crime if released before trial. However, these
pretrial algorithms have what I term an “input problem.”4 They inform
life-altering decisions around pretrial release, detention, and electronic
monitoring.5 Yet, their employment and operation cannot be stopped,
shaped, or influenced by the racially marginalized communities most likely
to be impacted by these algorithms.6
The input problem has three dimensions. First, jurisdictions regularly
adopt these algorithms in opaque ways without consulting racially
marginalized communities, even though these communities are
disproportionately affected by their utilization. 7 Second, these communities
tend to be shut out of the algorithmic construction process,8 meaning that the
factors utilized by these algorithms have not been subjected to community
scrutiny.9 Moreover, these algorithms are often constructed by organizations
3

Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2221–28 (2019) [hereinafter Mayson,
Bias] (“Over the last five years, criminal justice risk assessment has spread rapidly.”); Kia Rahnama,
Science and Ethics of Algorithms in the Courtroom, 2019 U. ILL. J. L., TECH. & POL’Y 169, 171 (2019)
(“These risk-assessment tools can match the information obtained from individual criminal defendants
with the patterns observed among past offenders with a similar background and make probabilistic
judgments about defendants’ future conduct.”). Though this Article focuses exclusively on the use of risk
assessment algorithms in bail, there is a body of scholarship on their use in sentencing. See, e.g., Jessica
M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017) [hereinafter Eaglin, Constructing];
Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57 (2018); John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing,
in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 77, 78–79
(Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/ReformingCriminal-Justice_Vol_4.pdf
4
The invocation of the term “input problem” contains a double meaning meant to capture both the
fact that these algorithms utilize racially disparate and carceral inputs and that they are designed and
implemented without input from the racially marginalized communities that stand to be most impacted
by these tools’ utilization.
5
See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 713 (2018) (noting that
these risk assessment tools are employed to impact judicial determination in relation to “the calculation
of nonappearance risk”) ; Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 492–93 (2018)
[hereinafter Mayson, Dangerous] (“To accomplish that objective, a growing number of jurisdictions are
adopting actuarial risk-assessment tools to sort high-risk from low-risk defendants.”); Chaz Arnett, From
Decarceration to E-carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 651 (2019) (noting that jurisdictions are
employing risk assessment tools to “determine the degree of surveillance [that a defendant] should be
subjected to if released”).
6
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 88–99 (describing the lack of democratic input that goes
into the construction and implementation of algorithmic tools used in the criminal legal system).
7
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and Democratic Control,
109 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 917–19 (2021) [hereinafter Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing] (noting how the
secrecy surrounding the adoption processes around algorithmic systems renders it difficult to track their
deployment and use).
8
Algorithmic construction concerns the process of data collection and selection, determination of
the meaning of risk in the context of a measurable outcome in pretrial trial system, selection of predictive
factors, and selection of risk thresholds. This process is generally performed by developers and other
technocrats with no input from community members. For more information about algorithmic
construction, see Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 73–88.
9
Community groups have discussed this problem at length. See, e.g., LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC.
FUND, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK A SSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL
RIGHTS CONCERNS 1–9, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-AssessmentFull.pdf (discussing lack of community consultation around algorithmic construction); Eaglin,
Constructing, supra note 3, at 108 (“More often, however, the tools are developed by private entities and
adopted by jurisdictions with limited opportunity for expert input and localized feedback.”).
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that have no internal mechanisms for facilitating outsider input about data
collection and data utilization. 10 Third, even where the public is provided
with an opportunity to express its views about impending pretrial
algorithmic governance,11 these participatory systems tend to be
unresponsive to those who oppose this form of governance, particularly
those hailing from communities that have been devastated by the carceral
state. The combination of all of these practices results in an anti-democratic
iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance that maintains these
communities’ traditional marginalization within pretrial governance.12
The input problem is neither exclusive to pretrial algorithms nor to
racially marginalized communities. Indeed, a growing number of scholars,
policymakers, and racial justice activists have raised serious concerns over
the use of algorithms in governmental processes, especially since these
algorithms are often deployed without meaningful public notice, input, or
oversight.13 This is partially caused by the fact that jurisdictions have tended
to outsource the construction, implementation, and ongoing maintenance of
such algorithms to the private sector.14 This privatization has enabled
algorithms to escape meaningful public debate and oversight, to the
detriment of traditional accountability metrics.15
But conversations about the absence of public input around algorithmic
governance have largely failed to attend to the particular harms that the input
problem imposes on poor and racially marginalized people.16 For these
communities, the input problem goes beyond the fact that algorithmic
governance, as currently employed, is opaque or non-inclusive of the
oppressed populations that are most likely to interact with it—though both
10

Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 118–21.
This Article’s definition of “pretrial algorithmic governance” is informed by and adds to Hannah
Bloch-Wehba’s definition of algorithmic governance, which is “the use of automated decision-making
methodologies by governments to inform the policymaking and adjudicative process.” Hannah BlochWehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2020) [hereinafter Bloch-Wehba,
Algorithms].
12
This Article uses the term “pretrial governance” to refer to the creation and implementation of
pretrial laws, policies, and practices.
13
See, e.g., Kate Weisburd, Punitive Surveillance, 108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (raising
concerns about the use of electronic surveillance); Bloch-Wehba, supra note 11 (raising concerns around
the opacity in the adoption and deployment of algorithmic systems; Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas,
The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018) (noting the
transparency concern around the use of AI-systems); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko,
Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015) (problematizing the lack of democratic input
around police use of surveillance technologies).
14
Bloch-Wehba, Algorithms, supra note 11, at 1272; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems
as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1941, 1942 (2019).
15
See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 10–15 (2015) (noting how algorithmic processes are opaque to
everyday citizens, decisionmakers, and legal processes).
16
But see Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (2019)
[hereinafter Roberts, Digitizing] (reviewing VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018)); Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically
Distorted Conceptions of Punishment, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 483 (2019) [hereinafter Eaglin,
Technologically] (recognizing the racial dimension of the use of risk assessment tools)
11
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issues pose barriers to rendering algorithms accountable to these
communities.17 The problem is that the exclusion of these communities
within algorithmic governance reinforces and legitimizes the barriers that
already impede their ability to challenge or to gain control over the criminal
legal institutions responsible for their oversurveillance, overcriminalization,
and over-incarceration.18
In the pretrial algorithmic governance context, these communities’
exclusion has already produced tangible and material consequences.
Broadly speaking, three consequences flow from their exclusion. First, their
exclusion from algorithmic construction has enabled the production of
pretrial algorithms that maintain existing racial disparities in the pretrial
system due to their utilization of inputs that are racially disparate, carceral,
and fail to account for the individual and communal harms that pretrial
incarceration enacts.19
Second, their exclusion within pretrial algorithmic governance operates
as an additional barrier to their efforts to resist a pretrial system that
overincarcerates their community members to the detriment of their
communal safety and cohesion.20 Third, the combination of the first two
consequences threatens to “lock-in”21 the racial status quo and resultingly
hampers the ability of these communities to collectively contest the political,
17
It is important to note that algorithmic governance by private actors did not inaugurate this
exclusion. Rather, this exclusion is a hallmark of pretrial governance, which itself operates to mute the
viewpoints and values of these communities. See Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice
Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017) [hereinafter Simonson,
Democratizing Criminal Justice].
18
For more information regarding the particular harms that the criminal legal system enacts on
Black people, see Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1485 (2016) (describing the vulnerability that Black people experience at
the hands of criminal legal institutions through repeated police interactions, which include policing
practices, mass criminalization, racial stereotyping, and racial segregation); Paul Butler, The System Is
Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1423–
25 (2016) (describing how the racial injustices experienced by Black people are the objective—as
opposed to the unintended consequence of the criminal legal system’s operation); Jamelia N. Morgan,
Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 1637 (2021) (discussing the intersection of race and
disability in the criminalization, surveillance, and incarceration of bodies as it pertains to the enforcement
of disorderly conduct offenses); Michael Pinard, Race Decriminalization and Criminal Legal System
Reform, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 120 (2020) (“While the criminal legal system particularly
infiltrates the lives of poor people, it is singularly relentless and merciless on Black men, women, and
children. It is common knowledge that Black communities have borne the brunt of mass incarceration,
mass convictions, and every other aspect of the criminal legal system.”).
19
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014) (contending that neutral inputs can operate as proxies for race that
“can be expected to contribute to the concentration of the criminal justice system’s punitive impact
among those who already disproportionately bear its brunt, including people of color”).
20
The adverse effects of this exclusion have pushed some community groups to push for community
representation in algorithmic governance. See CMTY. JUST. EXCH., AN ORGANIZER’S GUIDE TO
CONFRONTING P RETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS IN D ECARCERATION CAMPAIGNS 33 (2019),
https://perma.cc/YLC4-MR4H (discussing the ways in which community members can influence and
shape the creation and deployment of algorithms used in the criminal legal system).
21
Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-In, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. F. 233, 235 (2019) (“Translating rules and decisionmaking procedures into algorithms grants
them a new kind of permanency, which creates an additional barrier to legal evolution.”).
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economic, and social costs that mass pretrial incarceration, alongside other
carceral practices, has had and continues to have on their communities. 22 The
extent of these consequences should dampen enthusiasm about the
transformative potential of algorithms since, unless the input problem is
attended to, well-meaning algorithmic reforms designed to redress racial
inequity in the pretrial system are doomed to reproduce existing barriers to
racial justice.23 This result should raise questions about the compatibility of
algorithmic governance with efforts to challenge and resist the racial and
socioeconomic bias and disparity of the current pretrial system and beyond.
This Article explores the consequences of the input problem for racially
marginalized communities and the difficulties associated with its redress.
Using the example of democratic exclusion in pretrial algorithmic
governance, its central claim is that the input problem limits the capacity of
pretrial algorithmic governance to combat racial injustices within the pretrial
system, since it contributes to the democratic exclusion experienced by these
oppressed communities in pretrial governance. This democratic exclusion,
in turn, works to deny members of these communities the agency to
collectively resist mass pretrial incarceration and pursue their own visions
of public safety within the pretrial context. Redressing the input problem
might be possible, but it requires a meaningful shift in power over pretrial
algorithmic governance to oppressed groups and, in so doing, endowing
them with control over if and on what basis algorithmic-based reforms are
pursued. But the actualization of this prescription would be in tension with
the intended aims and objectives sought by proponents of algorithm-based
reforms (“algorithm reformers”). On the other hand, more modest
approaches to redressing the input problem risk largely preserving it while
enabling pretrial algorithmic governance to benefit from the veneer of
communal approval. Given this, this Article concludes that both the extent
of change required to attend to the input problem and the potential backlash
in so attending reveal a deep, unreconcilable tension between the algorithm
project and racial justice efforts.
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, it
adds to the current scholarly conversation on algorithms, accountability, and
community participation. Many scholars have explored how the opaque
ways in which algorithms are procured and designed obstruct efforts to
subject automated governmental decision-making to public scrutiny and

22
See Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1597, 1604 (2017) [hereinafter Roberts, Democratizing] (noting that the system of incarceration
“targets entire black communities for state regulation that deprives them of the resources, liberties, and
legitimacy needed for democratic participation”).
23
See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 807 (2021)
[hereinafter Simonson, Police Reform] (discussing this problem in policing process and contending that
layers of democratic exclusion in the criminal legal system have facilitated the “reproducing and
legitimizing [of] an unequal and racialized system of justice”).
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24

oversight. Yet, these discussions tend to revolve around transparency,
without sufficient attention to power.25 Though transparency is a crucial
precondition to rendering algorithmic governance democratically
accountable to the public,26 transparency alone cannot attend to the multiple
layers of democratic exclusion experienced by oppressed communities.
Transparency may redress power inequities stemming from informational
discrepancies existing between government institutions and the public
generally.27 It may also increase public participation in algorithmic
governance. However, transparency on its own is inattentive to the “layers
of democratic exclusion” that reinforce the political powerlessness
experienced by those most harmed by the system, who are thus unable to
change the system or dismantle and reconstitute it.28 By attending to power,
this Article expands the contours of the traditional democratic critique in
algorithmic literature and is the first to connect it to the burgeoning body of
criminal procedure scholarship considering the promises and pitfalls of
democratizing criminal legal institutions for oppressed communities.29
Second, this Article joins the racial justice strands of the
democratization of criminal law scholarship30 with race critical code

24
See Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing, supra note 7, at 919 (discussing how “new surveillance
technology tends to operate in opaque and unaccountable ways, augmenting police power while
remaining free of meaningful oversight); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing,
15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503, 504 (2018) (noting that “big data policing is opaque, lacking transparency
because most of the magic happens as a result of “black box” proprietary and mathematically complex
algorithms”). Amanda Levendowski, Resisting Face Surveillance with Copyright Law, N.C.L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (noting the secrecy around the datasets used by facial surveillance companies)
25
Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV.
613, 615 (2019) (contending that “[u]sing algorithms to make commercial and social decisions is really
a story about power, the people who have it, and how it affects the rest of us”). See Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1258 (2008) (contending that automation
transparency is insufficient); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024
(2017) (contending that algorithmic transparency is insufficient to redress algorithmic discrimination
because “[e]ven a transparent, facially neutral algorithm can still produce discriminatory results”).
26
It is also important to note that, for those seeking to subvert existing technologies for racial justice
aims, transparency is critical. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Policing, Technology, and Doctrinal Assists, 69
FLA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2017) (contending that techno-policing, such as body cams, could be harnessed
to remake and enhance Fourth Amendment protections).
27
Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing, supra note 7, at 922–23.
28
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 1610.
29
Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 23, at 799–802; K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson,
The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 696–99 (2020) (advocating for
endowing oppressed communities with control over governmental institutions involved in racial and class
subordination).
30
This Article engages with a specific strand of the democratization of criminal law scholarship,
which is concerned with redressing the democratic harms of the criminal legal system that subordinates
oppressed communities in our society. In this context, democratization involves endowing these
communities with a level of control over the criminal legal system in order to eliminate these harms. See
Roberts, Democratizing, supra note 22, at 1605 (“Democratizing criminal law requires dismantling
itsanti-democratic aspects altogether and reconstituting the criminal justice system without them.”)
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31

scholarship to reveal and to critique the technological determinist32
undercurrent in current legal scholarship on algorithmic governance and
democracy. Thus far, the race critical code literature and the democratization
of criminal law literature have largely evolved on separate tracks. Tapping
into both sets of literature, this Article rejects the dominant technological
determinist framing in which algorithmic governance is presented as
inaugurating the problem of democratic exclusion. By so doing, this Article
argues that algorithmic governance serves merely to entrench and to legitimate
the existing democratic exclusion experienced by racially marginalized
people in the crafting and implementation of criminal laws and policies. This
recognition permits us to start to grapple with the ways in which new
technologies reinforce the racial status quo, augmenting, as opposed to
creating, the political powerlessness of already disempowered communities
to contest and to resist their subordination within the criminal legal system.33
Third, this Article joins a growing set of scholarship considering the
congruency between algorithm-based reforms and racial justice efforts.
These scholars question the viability of repurposing algorithmic tools in
order to challenge and contest structures of power.34 This Article adds
31
E.g., RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM
CODE 9 (2019) [hereinafter BENJAMIN, A BOLITIONIST ] (noting how “race itself [is] a kind of tool—one
designed to stratify and sanctify social injustice as part of the architecture of everyday life”); SIMONE
BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 11 (2015) [hereinafter BROWNE,
DARK MATTERS]; SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES
REINFORCE RACISM 1 (2018); Ruha Benjamin, Introduction: Discriminatory Design, Liberating
Imagination, in CAPTIVATING TECHNOLOGY: RACE, CARCERAL TECHNOSCIENCE, AND LIBERATORY
IMAGINATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1–22 (Ruha Benjamin ed., 2019) [hereinafter Benjamin,
Discriminatory Design].
32
I use the term “technological determinism” as invoked in T IM JORDAN, HACKING: DIGITAL
MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 13 (2008) to refer to the belief that social structures and
values are highly shaped and augmented by new technologies. See also BENJAMIN, ABOLITIONIST, supra
note 31, at 40; BROWNE, DARK MATTERS, supra note 31, at 8–9 (cautioning, in the context of
surveillance, against viewing “surveillance as something inaugurated by new technologies,” and instead
seeing it as ongoing, which “is to insist that we factor in how racism and antiblackness undergird and
sustain the intersecting surveillances of our present order”).
33
Benjamin, Discriminatory Design, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing how “emerging technologies
can reinforce interlocking forms of discrimination, especially when we presume they are insulated from
human influence”).
34
See, e.g., Sean Allan Hill II, Bail Reform & the (False) Racial Promise of Algorithmic Risk
Assessment, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (contending that pretrial algorithms are incompatible
with achieving racial justice aims in the pretrial system); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1055–56 (2019) (contending that the racial equity of algorithms
depends on their impact on existing racial stratification); SASHA COSTANZA-CHOCK, DESIGN JUSTICE:
COMMUNITY-LED PRACTICES TO BUILD THE WORLDS WE NEED 63 (2020) (noting that “[a] prison
abolitionist stance does not support allocating additional resources to the development of tools [such as
risk assessment] that extend the [Prison Industrial Complex], even to make them ‘less biased’”);
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE 2–3 (2007) (discussing the problems with risk prediction in criminal legal context);
BENJAMIN, ABOLITIONIST, supra note 31, at 52–54 (raising doubts about the viability of achieving antiracist ends by utilizing currently employed technological systems). But cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND. L. REV. 561, 630–31 (2019) (contending
predictive technologies should be used to monitor and to check police behavior); Vincent M. Southerland,
The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Legal System, 80 MD. L. REV. 487, 494,
532 (2021) (proposing that predictive technologies should be used for abolitionist projects).
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another layer to this critique by advancing that the solvability of the
democratic exclusion problem caused by algorithmic governance will affect
the usefulness of algorithm-based reforms by those engaged in anti-racist
projects. If algorithms cannot endow the most impacted communities with a
voice to direct a system that has traditionally subordinated and muted their
interests, then it is of no use to those in the struggle for racial justice.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I contextualizes the rise of risk
assessment algorithms in the pretrial process and explains their
methodology. Part II details the input problem and explains how currently
employed algorithms reproduce and maintain the democratic exclusion
experienced by marginalized communities within pretrial governance and
beyond. Part III theorizes potential approaches to redressing the input
problem. It then sets out a power-shifting model for combating the input
problem: the creation of bail commissions at the state and federal levels
consisting of members from affected communities who have the power to
determine if and on what basis to pursue pretrial algorithmic governance.
Part IV addresses the benefits of this approach. Part V sets out anticipated
objections to actualizing this approach and how these objections signal a
potential incompatibility of the algorithm project with democratizing efforts
that are rooted in racial justice.
Two caveats are in order. First, this Article is primarily focused on the
tension associated with redressing the input problem. It makes no claim
about the outcomes that might be achieved through shifting power over
algorithmic governance toward historically disempowered groups. As many
scholars have observed in their explorations of endowing politically and
historically marginalized people with control over criminal legal
institutions, shifting power guarantees no particular outcome.35 It could spell
the end of algorithmic governance or reproduce the same or a more punitive
and racially disparate version of it. The point of surfacing the input problem
is to facilitate a greater appreciation for the racial justice implications and
first-principle disagreements about the continuation of algorithmic
governance. Second, in critiquing the lack of power and agency that
low-income, racially marginalized communities have in algorithmic
governance, this Article makes no claim about the role that developers,
criminologists, policymakers, and other technocrats should play in
algorithmic governance if the power-shifting model is enacted. Shifting
power does not mean the end of reliance on the expertise possessed by
technocrats; rather, it spells the dismantlement of the exclusive reliance on
this form of expertise. The expected backlash to such a dismantlement
reveals one of the several tensions associated with redressing the input
problem, demonstrating this Article’s central claim.

35

Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 23, at 807.
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I. CONTEXTUALIZATION
This Part contextualizes the proliferation of pretrial algorithmic
governance. It then sets out the methodology behind currently employed
algorithms, setting the stage for the discussion of the input problem.
A. The Rise of Pretrial Algorithmic Governance
Pretrial algorithmic governance has become a popular component of
recent efforts to reform the pretrial system.36 Approximately twenty-five
percent of Americans live in a jurisdiction that uses a pretrial algorithm.37
Nearly every state has at least one county that uses a pretrial algorithm.38 In
the last decade, at least twenty-five states have either implemented or tabled
legislation mandating the use of pretrial algorithms statewide 39⎯even New
York state, which passed sweeping legislation to curtail the practice of
conditioning pretrial release on cash bail for most nonviolent offenses, made
allowances for the continued use of algorithms in the pretrial setting to
determine release conditions.40 The trend towards pretrial algorithmic
governance appears set to continue, as political pressure to depopulate jails
mounts in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.41
The expanded reliance upon pretrial algorithmic governance has arisen
from a growing recognition that our current bail system is plea-inducing,42

36
Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely Anything.
Except This., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/prison-reform-billrepublicans-democrats.html.
37
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 13 (2017) (“The good news
is that this analysis shows 25% of people living in the United States now reside in a jurisdiction that uses
a validated evidence-based pretrial assessment.”).
38
Where Are Risk Assessments Being Used?, MAPPING PRETRIAL INJUSTICE, https://pretrialrisk.c
om/national-landscape/where-are-prai-being-used/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
39
Alicia Solow-Niederman, YooJung Choi & Guy Van den Broeck, The Institutional Life of
Algorithmic Risk Assessment, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 705, 714 (2019) (“In the last seven years alone,
half of U.S. states have either implemented or are seriously considering the use of some form of risk
assessment tools in pretrial settings.”).
40
FY 2020 NEW YORK STATE EXECUTIVE BUDGET: PUBLIC PROTECTION AND GENERAL
GOVERNMENT: ARTICLE VII LEGISLATION 182 (2019) [hereinafter New York Bail Reform Law],
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/artvii/ppgg-artvii.pdf .
41
Rafael A. Mangual, Not Quite Fixed: Adjustments to New York’s Bail Reform Leave Many of the
Law’s Holes Unplugged, CITY J. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.city-journal.org/risks-of-bad-bail-reform
(advocating for the greater use of risk assessment algorithms in the pretrial system in the wake of COVID).
42
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21, 22 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) [hereinafter Stevenson &
Mayson, Pretrial Detention], https://law.asu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/ReformingCriminal-Justice_Vol_3.pdf (“The increase in convictions [following pretrial detention] is primarily an
increase in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise would have had their charges dropped. The
plea-inducing effect of detention undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself—
especially if some of those convicted are innocent.”).
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costly, and racially and socioeconomically disparate. Nearly 500,000
defendants in jail are pretrial detainees.46 This means that sixty-six percent
of inmates in city and county jails have not been convicted of a crime but
instead are awaiting trial and the judicial resolution of their case.47
Moreover, the pretrial detainee population is racially distorted. To illustrate
this, it is useful to consider the racial composition of inmates held in city and
county jails, since the majority of this population is pretrial detainees. Black
people constitute thirty-three percent of jail inmates, despite constituting
only thirteen percent of the population.48 The jail incarceration rate for Black
people (592 per 100,000)49 is more than three times that of white people (187
per 100,000).50
These figures have fueled momentum around pretrial reform. In theory,
the pretrial system seeks to balance a defendant’s liberty interest before trial
with the societal interest in the incapacitation of dangerous defendants and
the adjudication of criminal offenses.51 Its purpose is to release defendants
before trial, except where their release poses a risk of non-appearance,
pretrial crime, or obstruction of justice.52 In practice, the pretrial process
differs from this ideal. First, a defendant’s pretrial detention is more
predicated on ability to afford the assigned bail bond than the risk of flight
or crime.53 Second, judges often require bail, even though in most cases it is
unnecessary to ensure a defendant’s court appearance and law-abiding
behavior.54 For instance, in bail schedule jurisdictions, bail judges are
mandated to set a predetermined monetary bail amount solely based on the
43
Id. (“Pretrial detention has profound costs. In fiscal terms, the total annual cost of pretrial jail
beds is estimated to be $14 billion, or 17% of total spending on corrections.”).
44
Yang, supra note 2, at 1465–67.
45
COLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, BAIL
REFORM: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 12 (2019), https://university.pretrial.org/vie
wdocument/bail-reform-a-guide-for-state-and (“This means that a defendant’s release depends upon an
ability to pay. Wealthy defendants walk free while poor defendants languish in jail.”).
46
ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 253044, JAIL INMATES IN 2018
1 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf.
47
Id. at 6.
48
Id. at 6, 12.
49
Id. at 4, 13.
50
Id.
51
Stevenson & Mayson, Pretrial Detention, supra note 42, at 24; Yang, supra note 2, at 1416.
52
Stevenson & Mayson, Pretrial Detention, supra note 42, at 24.
53
Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes,
34 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 511, 513 (2018) (arguing that “most people who are detained pretrial are detained
due to an inability to pay bail”).
54
Bail is set in most cases because of the assumption that bail is required to ensure a defendant’s
appearance or compliance with the law on release. This assumption does not bear out in practice. See
DOYLE, BAINS & HOPKINS, supra note 45, at 12–13 (“Money bail’s connection to public safety is tenuous
at best. Bail is not a means of preventing or deterring a defendant from committing crimes before trial. .
. . Money bail is not necessary to ensure that defendants reappear for trial.”). It is also important to note
the importance of community bail funds in undermining the necessity of money bail to prevent pretrial
crime and flight. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 591 (2017)
[hereinafter Simonson, Nullification] (“Community bail funds provide to the public real-life examples of
indigent defendants returning to court without having undermined public safety, despite an expert judicial
determination that personal money was needed to prevent flight and mayhem.”).
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crime charged, an amount that bears no relation to a defendant’s flight or
crime risk.56 Similarly, in jurisdictions where bail is set on the basis of
statutory factors, bail determinations are often rushed and conducted without
sufficient attention to the full range of nonfinancial release options available
to manage a defendant’s pretrial risk.57
The greater utilization of pretrial algorithmic governance is one of
dozens of bail reform proposals percolating around the country.58 Pretrial
algorithms are central to this project, and they tend to be risk assessment
algorithms that use an actuarial method and information about the defendant
to predict the likelihood that the defendant will fail to appear or will be
arrested for pretrial misconduct if released before trial.59 The risk prediction
or “risk score” produced is then used as a factor for detaining the defendant
or for determining “the degree of surveillance [the defendant] should be
subjected to if released.”60 This measure aims to improve bail
decision-making by conditioning release and detention on a defendant’s
riskiness to public safety.61 The technology is intended to empower bail
judges to identify and release low-risk defendants and to reserve pretrial
detention for high-risk defendants.62 The hope behind this technology is that
bail judges will rely on the assessments supplied by these algorithms rather
than their own subjective views of a defendant’s riskiness—views that are
often riddled with inaccuracy, irrationality, and bias.63 Empirical studies
demonstrate that bail decisions are susceptible to racial bias. For instance, a
2017 study by David Arnold, Will Dobbie, and Crystal Yang, which
compared the pretrial conduct of marginally released white defendants with
marginally released Black defendants, found that bail judges erroneously
overestimated Black defendants’ pretrial crime risk in comparison to that of
55

55

Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 445 (2016).
In recent years, bail schedules have been the subject of constitutional challenges under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses for discriminatorily tying pretrial release to monetary amounts
unaffordable to indigent defendants without a legitimate or compelling reason. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris
Cnty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1067 (S.D. Tex. 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-20333 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2018).
57
Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 932 (2013).
58
Baughman, supra note 1, at 949, 981–85 (noting the various types of bail reform currently
underway in the country); Ben Grunwald, How to Reduce the Prison Population by X% (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (contending that eliminating bail is one option for reducing prison
populations).
59
Mayson, Dangerous, supra note 5, at 509 (“Statisticians develop such tools by analyzing
aggregated pretrial data to identify the traits of defendants that correlate most closely with the outcome
of concern. Those traits are deemed ‘risk factors.’ The developers then create a checklist that assigns
each risk factor a number of points corresponding to how closely it is correlated with the bad outcome in
the group data.”) (footnotes omitted).
60
Arnett, supra note 5, at 651.
61
Mayson, Dangerous, supra note 5, at 492–93 (“The core reform goal is to untether pretrial
detention from wealth and tie it directly to risk. To accomplish that objective, a growing number of
jurisdictions are adopting actuarial risk-assessment tools to sort high-risk from low-risk defendants.”).
62
Id. at 515.
63
Id. at 508, 516.
56
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white defendants, whose risk was correspondingly underestimated. More
specifically, in their evaluation of 177 bail judges, the researchers found that
marginally released white defendants were twenty-two point two percent
more likely to be rearrested for alleged pretrial misconduct than were
marginally released Black defendants.65 This variance could not be
explained by white-Black differences in the characteristics (such as criminal
history) or the type of crimes charged among the study participants.66
Instead, the study concluded that the higher rate in arrests for offenses
allegedly committed by marginally released white defendants demonstrated
that bail judges were “relying on inaccurate stereotypes that exaggerate the
relative danger of releasing [B]lack defendants versus white defendants at
the margin.”67 In so finding, their study is reflective of prior studies that have
been conducted throughout the country, evidencing the extent to which
racial stereotypes infect and taint the bail determination process.68
The increased use of pretrial algorithms has ignited a fraught debate in
bail reform circles regarding the merits of using predictive technologies in
the pretrial process. Algorithm reformers claim that algorithms offer an
objective and evidence-based path towards substantially lowering high rates
of incarceration69 and racial and socioeconomic disparities without
endangering community safety, by identifying for pretrial release those
posing a low risk of non-appearance and arrest for offending.70
64
David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON.
1885, 1917 (2018).
65
Id. (noting that “[t]aken together, these [results] imply that marginally released white defendants
are 22.2 percentage points more likely to be rearrested prior to disposition than marginally released black
defendants . . . consistent with racial bias against [B]lacks”).
66
Id. at 1929 (stating that “[o]ur estimates are nearly identical if we account for observable crime
and defendant differences by race, indicating that our results cannot be explained by [B]lack–white
differences in the probability of being arrested for certain types of crimes (e.g., the proportion of felonies
versus misdemeanors) or [B]lack–white differences in defendant characteristics (e.g., the proportion of
defendants with prior offenses versus no prior offenses)”).
67
Id.
68
See, e.g., Meghan Sacks, Vincenzo A. Sainato & Alissa R. Ackerman, Sentenced to Pretrial
Detention: A Study of Bail Decisions and Outcomes, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 661, 677–78 (2015)
(discussing the issue of racial difference in imposition of monetary bail amounts).
69
Christopher Slobogin, Preventive Justice: How Algorithms, Parole Boards and Limiting
Retributivism Could End Mass Incarceration, 56 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97 (2021) (“[T]he quantified
results of well-validated [risk assessment instruments] can provide a concrete, rational basis for diversion
or release. If . . . adherence to those results is required in most circumstances, the human urge to
incapacitate those in the law’s grasp can be even more effectively resisted because decision-makers must
obey the objective facts.”).
70
See, e.g., Stevenson & Mayson, Pretrial Detention, supra note 42, at 29–34 (describing the how
the turn to actuarial risk assessment holds the promise of reducing unwarranted disparities); Sam CorbettDavies, Sharad Goel & Sandra González-Bailón, Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal
Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithmsbail-criminal-justice-system.html (describing the benefits that can accrue from using algorithms in the
criminal legal system); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 875 (2016) (describing one of the allures of machine
learning algorithms as its ability to ostensibly disaggregate low-risk defendants from high risk ones even
where the factors that tend to increase a defendant’s probability of committing misconduct is
multifaceted); Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf, Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing
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At the same time, a racial justice movement has coalesced in opposition
to the use of pretrial algorithmic governance, voicing concerns about its
bias,71 fairness,72 due process,73 and opacity.74 They fear that the increased
employment of these algorithms will maintain the racial status quo within
the pretrial system, while simultaneously obscuring—or worse,
legitimizing—its existence.75 The above racial justice concerns have begun
to materialize.76 Part II will continue to discuss ways in which the input
problem has contributed to the racial justice challenge presented by
algorithmic governance.
The next section of this Article introduces the kind of algorithms used
in the pretrial process. Its aim is not to provide a comprehensive overview
of the inner workings of all the pretrial algorithms that have been or are being
developed in the country.77 Instead, this Part examines the common features
of these algorithms, setting the stage for the discussion in Part II about how the

Transparency and Predictability, and (Possibly) Bridging the Gap Between Sentencing Knowledge and
Practice, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 654 (2018) (contending another appeal of algorithmic
decision-making is its promise of rendering consistent and predictable decisions).
71
Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
1671, 1671–72 (2020).
72
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 672
(2016); Ion Meyn, Race-Based Remedies in Criminal Law, 63 WM. & MARY L. REV. 219, 247–51 (2021).
73
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1375–76 (2018); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 659, 663 (2018).
74
Bloch-Wehba, Algorithms, supra note 11, at 1267 (noting that the opacity of algorithmic
governance is a barrier to subjecting algorithms to public scrutiny and debate). But see Jon Kleinberg,
Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018) (contending that “[t]he opacity of the algorithm does not prevent us
from scrutinizing its construction”).
75
See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big
Data in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 982 (cautioning that moving toward
big data algorithmic solutions risks further entrenching past racial inequities while making them “harder
to successfully challenge and expose because they are presented as part of the ‘hard science’ of big data”);
Eaglin, Technologically, supra note 16, at 487 (noting how sentencing risk assessment tools function to
“reify structural racism under the auspice of scientific objectivity.”).
76
The greater use of this technology has not substantially reduced racial disparities in the pretrial
process though it has reduced overall number of persons detained pretrial trial. The experience in New
Jersey is illustrative. In 2017, New Jersey implemented PSA statewide, overhauling its cash-based system
in favor of a system of detention based on risk. GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM: JAN 1–DEC 31 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 3–4 (2019),
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf. The switch was lauded as a success, with
the pretrial population falling by nineteen percent in its first year and by thirteen percent in its second
year. Id. at 38. The racial makeup of the New Jersey pretrial population has largely remained constant,
despite the reform. Id. at 27 (noting that the racial percentage of Blacks in jail in 2018 was the same as
2012; however, between this period, the Latinx population declined by two percent and the white
population increased by two percent). A similar result occurred in North Carolina. CINDY REDCROSS,
BRIT HENDERSON, LUKE MIRATRIX & ERIN VALENTINE, MDRC CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST. RSCH.,
PRETRIAL JUSTICE REFORM STUDY: EVALUATION OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORMS THAT USE
THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: EFFECTS IN MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 7
(2019), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/PSA_Mecklenburg_Brief1.pdf.
77
There is already substantial scholarship on that point⎯for example, Eaglin, Constructing, supra
note 3; Mayson, Dangerous, supra note 5, at 509.
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current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance entrenches the input problem
experienced by members from low-income racially marginalized communities.
This Article uses the terms “pretrial algorithm” and “risk assessment
tool” to refer to an assessment that employs statistical methods and big data
to forecast the likelihood that a defendant will engage in misconduct, thereby
meriting detention.78 Both terms refer to non-automated and automated
tools, which were created by a statistically derived process. Examples
include the Wisconsin 2009 Risk Assessment Instrument (a checklist) and
more sophisticated tools, such as COMPAS and PSA.79
B. Features of Currently Employed Algorithms
Though a relatively new phenomenon in the pretrial process, risk
assessment tools have a long and controversial history in penal structures.
Their initial use was in parole, where the risk scores they produced shaped
parole officials’ determinations of an offender’s candidacy for supervised
release.80 Starting in the 2000s, whilst facing the economic consequences of
mass incarceration, states and the federal government turned to sentencing
risk assessment tools as a low-cost solution to reducing the incarcerated
population.81 As Jessica Eaglin explains, these tools were “meant to limit
and shape the exercise of criminal law actors’ discretion at the systemic
level” in order to promote the release of “low risk” offenders.82 The theory
was that the risk scores produced would encourage judges to identify
offenders classified as having a low risk of recidivism and to divert them to
alternative programs. Despite not substantially reducing the incarcerated
population in practice, risk assessment tools became and remain a popular
bipartisan tool.83
Pretrial algorithms share the same methodology as their parole and
sentencing counterparts. They predict a defendant’s likelihood of pretrial
misconduct by identifying the extent to which the defendant’s traits
correspond with the traits of other defendants who have engaged in

78
I am adopting the definition provided in Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2228. It is worth noting
that none of the pretrial algorithms in use are machine learning.
79
SARAH L. DESMARAIS & JAY P. SINGH, CSG JUST. CTR., RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
VALIDATED AND IMPLEMENTED IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (2013),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Risk-Assessment-Instruments-Validated-andImplemented-in-Correctional-Settings-in-the-United-States.pdf; NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE
TO COMPAS (2012), http://www.northpointeinc.com/files/technical_documents/FieldGuide2_081412.
pdf; Risk Assessment Factsheet: Public Safety Assessment (PSA), STAN. L. SCH. POL’Y LAB (May 10,
2019) [hereinafter PSA Risk Assessment Factsheet], https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uplo
ads/2019/05/PSA-Sheet-CC-Final-5.10-CC-Upload.pdf.
80
Richard A. Berk & Justin Bleich, Statistical Procedures for Forecasting Criminal Behavior: A
Comparative Assessment, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 513, 513–16 (2013).
81
Eaglin, Technologically, supra note 16, at 489–90.
82
Id. at 504.
83
Id. at 485–86.
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84

non-appearance or arrest for alleged commission of crime. These features
are referred to as risk factors, which are either static or dynamic factors.85
Static factors are unalterable traits that a defendant possesses, such as current
age.86 Dynamic factors refer to traits that a defendant currently possesses,
but which tailored interventions could alter—examples include drug
dependency or employment status.87 To create these algorithms, statisticians
feed a mathematical model with data about a set of pretrial defendants to
identify the traits that statistically correlate with pretrial flight and crime.
Since statisticians have imperfect data about pretrial flight and crime, they
program the mathematical model to identify traits closely associated with a
defendant’s failure to appear at trial and rearrests for a new crime.88 These
traits are then deemed risk factors that developers rely on to create the
pretrial algorithm. Within the algorithm, each risk factor is assigned “a
number of points corresponding to how closely it is correlated with the bad
outcome [of nonappearance or rearrest] in the group data.”89 The most
common risk factors utilized are employment status, charges currently
pending, prior custodial sentences, past record for failure to appear, drug
use, residential ties, and age.90
Though some pretrial algorithms are made in-house, many jurisdictions
that have made the transition have chosen to rely on privately developed and
owned algorithms. Two popular, privately developed algorithms are
COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions Pretrial Release Risk Scale II) and PSA (Public Safety
Assessment). For this reason, the following section provides a detailed view
of these two popular off-the-shelf algorithms.
1. Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions Pretrial Release Risk Scale II (COMPAS)
COMPAS91 is a proprietary and commercially available pretrial risk
assessment algorithm that was developed by Northpointe (now Equivant), a
for-profit company. The model is the product of an analysis performed on a
dataset consisting of 2,831 felony defendants on pretrial release in Kent
County, Michigan, over a three-year period.92 From that analysis, its
developers created an automated algorithm consisting of eight factors: a
84

Mayson, Dangerous, supra note 5, at 509.
Eaglin, Technologically, supra note 16, at 490.
Id. at 491.
87
Id.
88
Mayson, Dangerous, supra note 5, at 509.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 512.
91
The COMPAS system described in this section is the 2019 version of the COMPAS system.
Information about the 2012 version can be found at: NORTHPOINTE, supra note 79.
92
Risk Assessment Factsheet: Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS) Pretrial Release Risk Scale II (PRRS-II), STAN. L. SCH. POL’Y LAB (June 20, 2019)
[hereinafter COMPAS Risk Assessment Factsheet], https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploa
ds/2019/06/COMPAS-PRRS-II-Factsheet-Final-6.20.pdf.
85
86
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defendant’s employment status; charges currently pending; prior custodial
sentences; past record for failure to appear; arrests and/or criminal charges
on pretrial release; drug use; most serious criminal offense; and residential
ties.93 Race is not a factor. The information needed to score the defendant is
obtained by an interview and reference to court records as well as case file
information.94 The model’s output is two risk scores, both in the range of
1-10.95 One of the scores predicts the risk of failure to appear while the other
forecasts the risk of a felony arrest.96 The defendant is then assigned a risk
classification. Beyond the risk factors utilized, little is publicly known about
COMPAS. For instance, the weight assigned to each risk factor is neither
publicly available nor provided to bail judges, prosecutors, defense counsel,
or even the affected defendant.97 Northpointe has been successful in
maintaining its secrecy by enforcing it in consumer contracts with procuring
jurisdictions and by asserting trade secret privilege.98 As a result, only
pretrial agencies and other licensed individuals are privy to the full inner
workings of COMPAS’s scoring process. Currently, two counties in
California, eight counties in Wisconsin, and one county in South Carolina
have adopted the algorithm.99
2. Public Safety Assessment (PSA)
PSA is a pretrial risk assessment algorithm developed by the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation (now Arnold Ventures), a nonprofit foundation,
which offers the model for free. The model was developed by examining a
dataset consisting of 750,000 defendants on pretrial release from
approximately 300 different jurisdictions across the United States over a
ten-year period.100 Like COMPAS, PSA does not use race or racial
information as an input. Yet, unlike COMPAS, PSA does not utilize
socioeconomic factors in its process. It only considers the following static
93

Id.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 772 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017)
(approving the use of risk assessment tools in the sentencing context). However, it is important to note
that there has been some recent efforts to limit or eliminate the ability of private companies to rely on
trade secret privilege to shield the methodology of such algorithms in criminal cases. See, e.g., H.B. 118,
65th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2019) (indicating that: “No builder or user of a pretrial risk assessment
algorithm may assert trade secret or other protections in order to quash discovery in a criminal matter by
a party to a criminal case.”); Press Release, U.S. Congressman Mark Takano of California’s 41st Dist.,
Rep. Takano Introduces the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’ Due Process
Rights in the Criminal Justice System (Sept. 17, 2019), https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/press-releas
es/rep-takano-introduces-the-justice-in-forensic-algorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-right
s-in-the-criminal-justice-system (noting that the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019 was introduced
to limit trade secret privilege so as to enable defendants to obtain source code of forensic algorithms).
99
COMPAS Risk Assessment Factsheet, supra note 92; MAPPING PRETRIAL INJUSTICE,
https://pretrialrisk.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
100
PSA Risk Assessment Factsheet, supra note 79.
94
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factors: age at current arrest; current violent offense; charges pending at the
time of the alleged offense; prior misdemeanor convictions; prior felony
convictions; prior violent convictions; prior failures to appear; and prior
incarceration sentences.101 Information required to score the algorithm does
not require an interview. From there, the model produces three different risk
scores, each assigned a weight: failure to appear risk (scored on a scale of
0-7), new violent crime activity risk (scored on a scale of 0-13), and new
criminal activity risk (scored on a scale of 0-7).102 Weight assignments are
publicly available. From that score, the defendant is provided a risk
classification. PSA has been adopted statewide in Kentucky, Arizona, New
Jersey, and at least ten counties outside of those three states.103
II. THE INPUT PROBLEM
This Part discusses the effect of the input problem on members from
historically and racially marginalized communities, specifically how the
input problem reproduces and entrenches the exclusion of these
communities within pretrial governance and society more broadly. Its aim is
not to suggest that the inclusion of these communities in algorithmic
governance would necessarily lead to pretrial algorithms that would reduce
or eliminate the problem of racialized pretrial incarceration. As discussed in
Part III, shifting power over pretrial algorithmic governance to the most
impacted communities promises no particular outcome.104 For this reason,
the aim of this Part is solely to lay out the consequences that the current
iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance has had on these
communities⎯consequences which these communities are unable to redress
due to their exclusion from this form of governance.
The input problem produces multiple layers of democratic exclusion105
for members from low-income, racially marginalized communities. The first
layer concerns the tools themselves and how members from these
communities are excluded from participating in the construction of
algorithms used in pretrial algorithmic governance.106 This results in pretrial
algorithms that are constructed with the normative assumptions of their
developers, assumptions that do not necessarily reflect the policies or
outcomes that are sought by the most impacted communities.107 The second
layer relates to how these communities’ exclusion from pretrial algorithmic
governance facilitates their systemic marginalization in the creation and
101
Public Safety Assessment: How It Works, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH. 1 (2020),
https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/factors/#psa-factors.
102
PSA Risk Assessment Factsheet, supra note 79.
103
Id.
104
Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 23, at 789.
105
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 1610–12 (discussing the multiple
layers of democratic exclusion in the criminal legal system as it pertains to racialized minorities).
106
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 88–94.
107
Id.
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implementation of pretrial law, policy, and practice more broadly. This
results in the creation and implementation of pretrial algorithms that
perpetrate the same features of the current pretrial system; features that many
in these communities seek to challenge and to resist. The final layer concerns
how the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance, through its
perpetuation of the first two layers of democratic exclusion, operates to
undermine efforts to contest the individual and collective political,
economic, and social costs that mass pretrial incarceration, alongside other
carceral practices, has had on these communities.109 This Part will address
each layer of democratic exclusion separately, since each produces a
particularized and severable harm to these communities that, in combination,
renders the pretrial system a site for the reproduction of racial and class
stratification.
A. Exclusion from Algorithmic Construction
A major consequence of communal exclusion from algorithmic
construction relates to the inputs relied on in currently employed pretrial
algorithmic systems. These inputs operate to reproduce and maintain
racialized pretrial incarceration by unfairly inflating the risk scores of
racially marginalized defendants. To illustrate this problem, this Article uses
two examples: (1) the prevalence of racially disparate inputs, and (2) the
exclusive use of carceral risk inputs.
1. Racially Disparate Inputs
Nearly all pretrial algorithms utilize racially disparate inputs. Even
though no pretrial algorithm explicitly uses race or racial information as an
input, they tend to use inputs that are closely correlated with race. For
instance, most pretrial algorithms include arrests and/or criminal records as
inputs for calculating risk, both of which are systematically connected to
historical and current racial inequities, including over-policing.110 The
COMPAS system considers a defendant’s criminal record, past arrest record,
past sentences to incarceration, and charges pending when calculating a
defendant’s risk of rearrest.111 Locally created and validated algorithms,
108
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 1610–12 (discussing the impact
of the most impacted communities’ exclusion in criminal law governance generally).
109
Roberts, Democratizing, supra note 22, at 1605 (discussing how carceral practices on black
communities “currently exclude[] [these] residents from democratic participation [and the] freedom to
develop their own democratic alternatives for addressing social harms”).
110
See generally Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987, 1020 (2019) [hereinafter
Roberts, Arrests] (noting how arrests disproportionately visited upon racially marginalized people and
do not correspond with guilt); Anna Roberts, Convictions as Guilt, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2020)
[hereinafter Roberts, Convictions] (same).
111
Risk Assessment Factsheet: Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS) Pretrial Release Risk Scale II (PRRS-II), STAN. L. SCH. POL’Y LAB (June 20, 2019)
[hereinafter
COMPAS
Risk
Assessment
Factsheet], https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/COMPAS-PRRS-II-Factsheet-Final-6.20.pdf.
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such as the Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT), tend to take into
account past arrests and criminal records.112 Even though PSA does not
explicitly consider a defendant’s past arrests, past convictions and charges
pending are utilized to determine a defendant’s risk of failure to appear.113
The use of charges pending, arrests, and past convictions by these
algorithms operates to unfairly inflate the risk scores of racially
marginalized defendants. When used against Black defendants, these factors
are more reflections of historic racial inequities rather than predictions of a
defendant’s propensity for future crime.114 An example of this problem
concerns arrest. Black people experience a higher rate of arrest compared to
their white counterparts.115 Though the true rate at which most criminal
offenses occur among different demographic groups is unknown, studies
indicate that the rate of Black arrests does not correlate to the rate of criminal
offenses committed by Black people. An example of this distortion concerns
drug crimes: Black people are arrested more often for drug crimes, despite
committing these crimes at similar rates to white people.116 Beyond arrest
rates, past criminal convictions and sentences to incarceration are also
unreliable proxies for criminal offending across different subpopulations,
since racially marginalized people are also more likely to be charged,
convicted, and sentenced to incarceration than their white counterparts.117
The data also suggests that prosecutors more often pursue charges against

112
COLO. ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS., THE COLORADO PRETRIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL (CPAT):
ADMINISTRATION, SCORING, AND REPORTING MANUAL VERSION 2, 3 (2015), https://university.pretrial
.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=47e978bb-3945-9591-7a4f
-77755959c5f5.
113
[PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: HOW IT WORKS, supra note 101, at 1.
114
Moreover, this state of affairs also inflates the myth of Black criminality which, as India Thusi
has argued, “[t]rigger[s] the perception of Blacks as criminal threats to the community in the absence of
harsh police tactics[,] [and] undermines arguments to recognize Black humanity.” India Thusi, Blue Lives
& the Permanence of Racism, 105 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 14, 23 (2020).
115
The Department of Justice has released reports on the high rates of Black arrests in New Orleans,
Ferguson, and Baltimore. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT 55–61 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download; U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 62–69 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE
DEPARTMENT 38–39 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_rep
ort.pdf; see also Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 758–59 (2018) [hereinafter Stevenson & Mayson, Misdemeanor Justice] (discussing the
disproportionate rate of Black arrests in the context of misdemeanor offenses).
116
See Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 189–90
(2013) (finding that “[B]lack defendants are more often arrested for drug crimes even though all races
commit drug crimes equally”).
117
Paul Butler, Race and Adjudication, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
PROCESSES, supra note 42, at 211, 211–12 (“People of color are more likely to be charged with serious
offenses, jailed prior to trial, convicted, and to receive a harsher sentence. These disparities exist even
when factors like the severity of the crime and the criminal history of the accused person are the same.”).
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and offer less favorable plea deals to Black defendants in comparison to
white defendants.118
These racial inequities dilute the predictive accuracy of the risk scores
produced by present-day algorithms. The 2016 ProPublica-Northpointe
debate is illustrative. In its study on the use of COMPAS in the bail hearings
of 7,000 defendants in Broward County, Florida, ProPublica compared the
risk classification that the algorithm assigned each defendant with their
actual commission of pretrial crime within the two years following their bail
hearing.119 ProPublica researchers concluded that COMPAS was racially
biased after finding that it erroneously flagged Black defendants as at high
risk for pretrial crime more often than it flagged white defendants, who were
correspondingly mistakenly flagged as at low risk for pretrial crime
compared to Black defendants.120 The source of the racial disparity in
COMPAS was its consideration of past arrests, convictions, and sentences
to incarceration in the determination of a defendant’s risk score.121 Because
the Black defendants were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to
incarceration more often than the white defendants in the study, the
algorithmic system assigned them a high-risk classification at
disproportionate rates. This produced a racial disparity even though
COMPAS did not explicitly take racial information into account in its risk
calculation. Importantly, COMPAS is not alone. Since most risk assessment
algorithms use these factors, these systems unfairly and disproportionally
falsely identify Black defendants as at high risk for pretrial crime in
comparison to white defendants.

118
See, e.g., Besiki L. Kutateladze, Nancy R. Andiloro, Brian D. Johnson & Cassia C. Spohn,
Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Prosecution and Sentencing, 52
CRIMINOLOGY 514, 518, 527–37 (2014) (identifying racial disadvantage in plea deals offered in New
York to Black defendants in comparison to other racial groups).
119
Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
120
It is worth noting that Northpointe disputed ProPublica’s findings, insisting that their algorithm
was racially neutral. In support of their position, Northpointe clung to the predictive accuracy of the
high-risk scores assigned, which showed that two defendants with the same base rate of arrests received
a high-risk classification and were arrested for committing a pretrial crime at nearly identical rates. Both
ProPublica and Northpointe’s assertions were correct but premised on different metrics of algorithmic
fairness. ProPublica’s study was concerned with COMPAS’s non-compliance with the metric of
statistical parity, which led the system to falsely identify Black defendants as at high risk of pretrial crime
at nearly twice the rate of white defendants. Northpointe defended itself by emphasizing COMPAS’s
compliance with the metric of predictive parity. Predictive parity in this context refers to the fact that two
defendants labelled with a COMPAS high-risk classification committed similar rates of pretrial crime.
Recent studies have demonstrated the impossibility of achieving both statistical parity and predictive
parity in an algorithmic system, resulting in most pretrial algorithms complying only with the metric of
predictive parity. See WILLIAM DIETERICH, CHRISTINA MENDOZA & TIM BRENNAN, NORTHPOINTE,
COMPAS RISK SCALES: DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 9–11 (2016),
https://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf
(explaining Northpointe’s response to the ProPublica report). See also Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at
2233–36 (describing the Northpointe and ProPublica debate); Deborah Hellman, Measuring
Algorithmic Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 816–20 (same).
121
Mayson, supra note 3, at 2234.
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2. Exclusive Use of Carceral Inputs
Another input selection issue involves what this Article terms the
exclusive utilization of “carceral inputs,” which refers to inputs that
ostensibly correspond with the risks that a defendant’s release poses to
public safety.122 Nearly all currently employed algorithms are constructed to
only account for the presence or absence of risk factors that correlate with a
defendant’s nonappearance at trial or arrest for pretrial crime. These algorithms
are not designed to factor in the harms associated with pretrial detention.
The exclusive reliance on carceral inputs results in these systems
obscuring and ignoring the harms associated with a defendant’s pretrial
detention. This is a problem because, as Crystal Yang has noted, there are
individual, familial, and communal harms associated with pretrial
detention.123 Individually, pretrial detention can be a physically,
emotionally, and mentally traumatizing event.124 This traumatization can
induce defendants to plead guilty despite innocence.125 On the familial side,
pretrial incarceration could lead to parental separation or even the loss of
parental rights as the children of incarcerated pretrial detainees are
transferred into the foster care system.126 For the community that the
defendant is part of,127 pretrial detention endangers that community’s safety
by destabilizing that defendant and reducing their prospect for financial and
social reintegration following their detention.128 The sole inclusion of
carceral inputs operates to maintain the negative externalities of
incarceration on these low-income, racially marginalized communities. By
disregarding the private and social costs that pretrial incarceration inflicts,
the algorithmic construction process has led to the creation of carceral
pretrial algorithms that are more likely to harm rather than to facilitate the
safety of these communities.

122
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017) (stating
that “[d]etainees are often victims of humiliation, rape, and other violent acts while incarcerated, and
they also suffer added anxiety, stress, and a lower quality of life as a result”).
123
Yang, supra note 2, at 1417–28.
124
Baughman, supra note 122, at 5–6.
125
Stevenson & Mayson, Pretrial Detention, supra note 42, at 22 (“The increase in convictions
[following pretrial detention] is primarily an increase in guilty pleas among defendants who otherwise
would have had their charges dropped. The plea-inducing effect of detention undermines the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system itself—especially if some of those convicted are innocent.”).
126
Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1482 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Black Mothers].
127
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 250–60 (2019) [hereinafter Simonson, Place of “The People”] (discussing how the criminal legal
system promotes the false notion that the defendant’s interest in pretrial release is in opposition to the
community’s interest in public safety).
128
Ifeoma Ajunwa & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Combating Discrimination Against the Formerly
Incarcerated in the Labor Market, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1385, 1394–98 (2018) (discussing the barriers
that conviction impose on formerly incarcerated people in the labor market).
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3. Failure to Utilize Communal Knowledge
The fact that the algorithmic construction process can produce
algorithmic systems that both ignore and reify racial inequities in the pretrial
process is a troubling paradox;129 these algorithms reproduce the inequities
that their employment is intended to counteract. On the one hand, the
problem flows from the nature of risk assessment itself. As Sandra Mayson
explains, risk assessment operates on the theory that the past will replicate
itself in the future.130 If the past is racially disparate, then the future
predictions of risk by pretrial algorithms will also be racially disparate.131
On the other hand, the problem hinges on the failure to utilize communal
information sources about the relationship between risk, crime, and the
attributes of crime-committers in the algorithmic construction process. To
date, developers have tended to exclusively rely on the data produced by
criminal legal institutions to inform decisions about which factors should be
included in algorithmic systems.132 Yet, data from criminal legal institutions
are notoriously incomplete, since most crimes are not reported133 and crime
statistics are infected with racially biased policing practices.134 The
exclusive reliance on the data produced by criminal legal institutions has
facilitated the prevalence of arrests and convictions as algorithmic factors,
even though these factors are not reliable proxies for a defendant’s
dangerousness, particularly as it pertains to members from racially
marginalized communities.135 This is because, for those communities,
arrests and convictions are more likely to be wrongfully produced, and they
do not necessarily correspond with factual guilt or dangerousness.136 The net
effect is that pretrial algorithms do not benefit from communal knowledge137
and instead are constructed with racially disparate and carceral information
that resultingly renders these systems less capable of predicting racially
marginalized defendants’ pretrial risk. The consequence is that the pretrial
algorithms of today consist of carceral and racially disparate inputs that
operate to reproduce existing racial disparities that serve largely to reflect

129

Ajunwa, supra note 71, at 1673.
Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2224–34.
131
Id. at 2251 (“Any form of prediction that relies on data about the past will produce racial
disparity if the past data shows the event that we aspire to predict—the target variable—occurring with
unequal frequency across racial groups.”).
132
I discuss this issue in Ngozi Okidegbe, Discredited Data, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2022).
133
Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1146 (2017).
134
Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2264.
135
Berk & Bleich, supra note 81, at 538–40 (finding that the use of past misdemeanor arrests and
the age of an offender’s earliest arrest were not reliable predictors of future offending for Black juvenile
defendants as compared to white juvenile defendants).
136
See, e.g., Roberts, Arrests, supra note 110, at 1020 (noting how arrest do not connote factual
guilt); Roberts, Convictions, supra note 110, at 2509 (noting how convictions can be wrongfully
produced).
137
Okidegbe, supra note 134.
130
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the racial inequities existing in the dispensing of arrests and convictions
within the criminal legal system.
B. Exclusion from Pretrial Governance
Communal exclusion from pretrial algorithmic governance operates to
reproduce these groups’ marginalization in pretrial governance. It is true that
before the deployment of pretrial algorithms, these communities were
democratically excluded from full participation in the creation,
implementation, and oversight of pretrial law, policy, and practices. As
Jocelyn Simonson’s work has demonstrated, this democratic exclusion results
from their political disempowerment.138 Unlike their wealthier and whiter
counterparts, members from these historically marginalized communities
have diminished electoral power to vote for bail judges and legislators who
reflect their communal preferences around pretrial justice.139 For this reason,
pretrial legislation, policy, and practice are responsive to the preferences of
socioeconomically powerful citizens, who have the financial resources to
influence the appointment and direct election of bail judges who share their
background and views around the pretrial system. More importantly, these
financial resources enable powerful groups to build, as Sabeel Rahman
notes, an “ecosystem of lobbying, advocacy, and model legislation” 140 that
impacts pretrial law, policy, and practice. For the above reasons, the most
impacted communities have diminished political power to render those in
charge of pretrial governance accountable to their needs and interests.
One effect of these communities’ political powerlessness relates to their
over-incarceration in the pretrial system. As Samuel Wiseman’s work has
demonstrated, the current political and social climate incentivizes bail
judges to over-detain defendants awaiting trial141⎯the reason being that bail
judges experience minimal consequences for detaining a low-risk defendant,
yet face intense public backlash for the release of a defendant who ultimately
commits another crime or flees the jurisdiction.142 For bail judges, the cost
of a release that is perceived as erroneous might mean the loss of their
judgeship.143 In contrast, no individual judge faces a real prospect of
impeachment or loss of an election from over-incarceration practices, since
members from those communities lack the political power to render these
judges democratically accountable to them. The state of affairs has meant
that decisions around pretrial release, detention, and surveillance are rarely
138

Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 1611–12,1621.
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 37 (2019)
(discussing how the collateral penalties from criminal punishment have diluted Black political power).
140
K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 318
(2018) (discussing this problem in the administrative context).
141
Wiseman, supra note 55, at 431.
142
For more information on this point, see generally RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF
POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
143
Wiseman, supra note 55, at 422.
139
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in line with the very communities that stand to be harmed by large-scale
pretrial incarceration.144
Though pretrial algorithms did not inaugurate the democratic exclusion
that these communities traditionally face within pretrial governance, their
utilization operates to reinforce it. This is because communities, due to their
exclusion from algorithmic governance, are unable either to affect the
algorithm’s construction or to viably challenge its results in a pretrial
hearing. To understand this problem, it is important to consider bottom-up
and confrontational practices145 that have emerged in recent years to contest
over-incarceration in the pretrial context. One important practice has been
the rise of community bail funds, which contest over-incarceration practices
within the pretrial system by systematically bailing out low-income
defendants, whose release enhances community safety.146 As Jocelyn
Simonson has noted, these communal bail funds reflect and inject a
communal voice about pretrial release practices.147 By bailing out a
defendant, a community bail fund shows that at least one segment of the
community contests the bail judge’s assessment that the defendant’s safe
release must hinge on the payment of an unaffordable bail amount. These
bottom-up practices have been an important disruptive practice that has
rendered visible the disconnect between the pretrial system’s operation and
the views and values of the most impacted communities.148
Despite their efficacy, such bottom-up practices are ineffective at
contesting and impacting pretrial interventions that are shaped by pretrial
algorithms. This is because many jurisdictions that utilize pretrial algorithms
have also eliminated the practice of cash bail, conditioning decisions around
release, detention, and surveillance instead on a defendant’s perceived

144
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 17 (noting how criminal law, policy,
practice, and decision-making is rarely responsive to those most harmed by it).
145
Amna A. Akbar, Law's Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC.
352, 364 (2015) (“[Social movements] make[] clear that the ordinary channels of accountability cannot
be relied on. . . . Contrary to traditional litigation and voting disconnected from a larger campaign, the
movement’s approaches are confrontational with the state, or turn away together to come back another
day stronger.”).
146
There are a number of community bail organizations actively bailing out low-income defendants,
such as One Community, NorCal Resist, and Chicago Community Bond Fund. Ways to Support the Black
Community and Combat Racism, ONE CMTY., https://www.onecommunity.co/ways-to-support-theblack-community-and-combat-racism (last visited Feb. 25, 2021); NorCal Resist Activist Bail & ICE
Bond Fund, NORCAL RESIST, https://actionnetwork.org/fundraising/ncrbailfund/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2021); Our Mission, CHI. CMTY. BOND FUND, https://www.chicagobond.org/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
147
See Simonson, Nullification, supra note 54, at 591 (“Community bail funds provide to the public
real-life examples of indigent defendants returning to court without having undermined public safety,
despite an expert judicial determination that personal money was needed to prevent flight and mayhem.”).
148
It is important to note that these practices are disruptive, but they also can unintentionally operate
to legitimate the system. Id. at 631. (“On the one hand, one might object to community bail funds—
especially when they resemble bail nullification—as a subversion of the rule of law; and on the other
hand, one might worry that a belief in the power of community bail funds risks legitimizing an unfair
procedural scheme.”).
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149

riskiness. Without the mechanism of cash bail, decisions around pretrial
detention cannot be influenced or counteracted by communal practices.
Community bail funds, for example, are powerless to facilitate the release
of a defendant, whose detention is partially conditioned on a risk prediction,
and not on cash bail. To be clear, the aim of recognizing this problem is not
to suggest a preference for cash bail. Cash bail is a socioeconomic and
racially disparate practice that has itself been a major contributor to the crisis
of racialized pretrial incarceration.150 Rather, the point is that pretrial
algorithmic governance means the foreclosure of avenues for disruptive and
influential communal participation in pretrial governance. This consequence
has even pushed a few community groups to seek inclusion in pretrial
algorithmic governance, despite their repudiation of the algorithm project.151
Given this, these communities’ exclusion from pretrial algorithmic
governance serves to reinforce their marginalization in the crafting and
implementation of the pretrial laws and policies that have promoted their
over-incarceration—therein hampering current efforts to reform or to
dismantle and rebuild the pretrial system to be in line with communal values
and viewpoints. 152
C. Exclusion from Full Participation in a Democratic Society
Both communal exclusion from algorithmic construction and this
exclusion’s reinforcement of these groups’ marginalization within pretrial
governance produce a system primed to uphold the racial status quo with no
effective avenue for communal resistance. This facilitation of the status quo
leads to a third layer of the input problem, which is pretrial algorithmic
governance’s exacerbation of the democratic harms that the criminal legal
system already enacts on marginalized communities. A number of scholars,
such as Dorothy Roberts, Janet Moore, Jocelyn Simonson, and others, have
argued that the criminal legal system enacts democratic harms on racially
marginalized communities by diluting their political, economic, and social
power to the point of denying them full participation in our democracy.153
By its exclusion of these communities, pretrial algorithmic governance,
alongside other criminal laws and practices, functions as a site that
149
Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In.,
ARNOLD VENTURES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-toreform-its-cash-bail-system-now-the-results-are-in/.
150
Arnold et al., supra note 64, at 1917.
151
See LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing lack of community
consultation around algorithmic construction).
152
See infra Section II.C.
153
Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
543, 547 (2014); Roberts, Democratizing, supra note 22, at 1605; Simonson, Police Reform, supra note
23, at 806–07; Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 734 (2020); see also
Zina Makar, Detention, Disenfranchisement, and Doctrinal Integration (Oct. 13, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (exploring how pretrial detention de facto strips detainees of their right
to vote).
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reproduces and contributes to the democratic harms experienced by these
communities, thus facilitating a racialized system.154
On this basis, the input problem sets pretrial algorithmic governance up
to reproduce the pretrial system’s political, economic, and social costs on
the most impacted communities. This is concerning since these costs
disentitle these communities from exercising their rights to full
citizenship.155 The pretrial system of detention adversely affects the
democratic participation of these communities. On account of the
plea-inducing impact of pretrial incarceration, many exit the system with a
criminal record that temporarily or permanently restricts their right to
vote.156 These restrictions dilute these communities’ political power to orient
the pretrial system away from policies that promote the over-incarceration
of their community members.157 Economically, pretrial incarceration strains
wealth production as financial, material, and intellectual resources are
diverted to the jail system.158 Alongside post-conviction incarceration,
pretrial incarceration operates as a redistribution of wealth from the poor to
the state, extracting the limited resources of low-income communities of
color, which in turn disrupts intergenerational wealth transfers and
perpetuates the racial cycle of poverty.159 Socially, the pretrial system
overextends social kinship networks, as those left behind are forced to
expend time and limited resources assuming the financial and caregiving
obligations of those who are incarcerated.160 The combination of these
consequences creates a racial, gendered, and class geography of disrupted
social kinship networks, economic disenfranchisement, and political
estrangement that operates to deny members from low-income Black
communities full citizenship, all of which the current iteration of pretrial
algorithmic governance contributes to and entrenches.

154

Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 23, at 807.
See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1277 (2004) [hereinafter Roberts, Mass Incarceration]
(contending that incarceration generally “has become a systemic aspect of community members’ family
affairs, economic prospects, political engagement, social norms, and childhood expectations for the
future.”).
156
See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the
Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1030–31
[hereinafter Yankah, Good Guys] (2004) (discussing the racial dimension of felon disenfranchisement)
157
Id. at 1031.
158
Roberts, supra note 155, at 1282.
159
Id.
160
See Roberts, Black Mothers, supra note 126, at 1482 (noting how the large-scale incarceration
of Black fathers disrupts family life and places an insurmountable burden on Black women caregivers,
who struggle to take upfill the financial and social void that the incarcerated person leaves behind). Ekow
N. Yankah, Punishing Them All: How Criminal Justice Should Account for Mass Incarceration, 97 RES
PHILOSOPHICA 185, 190 (2020) [hereinafter Yankah, Punishing Them All] (“The incarceration of large
numbers from particular communities undermines the fabric that sustains essential community
functions.”).
155
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III. SOLVING THE INPUT PROBLEM
Part II set out the particular harms that the input problem imposes on
members from low-income racialized communities. In this Part, this Article
discusses the most promising redress to the input problem: shifting power
over pretrial algorithmic governance to members from the most impacted
communities. To do this, it starts by discussing the growing consensus
around the need for public input into algorithmic design. It then
demonstrates the limitations associated with approaches to the input problem
that do not shift power over algorithmic governance to these communities.
Using the example of Pennsylvania, which held a series of public hearings
around its decision to employ a sentencing algorithm, it contends that such
approaches, though politically palatable and implementable, largely
maintain the input problem whilst presenting the risk that communal
participation will be misconstrued as communal approval. It then sets out
the dimensions of this Article’s power-shifting model. The promise and
anticipated objections to this power-shifting model are discussed in detail in
Part IV and Part V.
A. Consensus Around Public Participation
Before discussing ways to resolve the input problem, it is necessary to
note the growing consensus around the importance of public participation in
algorithmic governance. While algorithmic governance was in its infancy,
there was a contentious debate about the necessity of public input.161
However, as algorithmic systems and structures have mushroomed in recent
years, a growing consensus about the importance of public participation in
algorithmic governance has emerged.162 It has become increasingly apparent
that the design and deployment of algorithmic systems could benefit from
public feedback, especially since these systems are not created in a political

161
Some claimed that soliciting public input might undermine the promising features of algorithmic
governance, namely its objectivity and insulation from the arbitrariness and bias of human decision
making. Since members of the public lack technical and policy expertise, giving credence to their
viewpoint risked diluting the accuracy and efficiency of algorithmic systems whilst also delegitimizing
the entire algorithmic project. Moreover, supporters of this viewpoint have tended to contest the idea that
public participation in algorithmic governance is a precondition for achieving algorithmic accountability
and legitimacy.
162
New York City has developed a task force highlighting the importance of public participation in
algorithmic governance. See, e.g., NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, NEW
YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT 22 (2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf (recommending
the broadening of public discussions on automated decision systems that New York agencies and offices
use in the course of providing public services). A few organizations have also created partnerships
between communities and state actors to facilitate public participation around technology. See
Responsible Use of Policing Technology, POLICING PROJECT N.Y.U. SCH. L.,
https://www.policingproject.org/policing-tech-landing (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (discussing the
importance of public input in the use of policing technologies).
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or social vacuum.
Constructing, implementing, and overseeing any
algorithmic system requires technocrats to make highly discretionary and
value-laden decisions that shape how law and public policy are applied. For
instance, as Jessica Eaglin has noted in the context of sentencing algorithms,
decisions around risk thresholds are unavoidably normative because it is
impossible to determine the cutoff between different risk thresholds without
confronting an unavoidable value judgment about the level of risk that is
socially acceptable.164 These realities have substantially undermined the
notion that algorithmic systems are neutral, impartial, or apolitical, or should
be devoid of public input.165 At the same time, concerns around algorithmic
accountability have bolstered ongoing support for public participation in
algorithmic governance, the idea being that the legitimacy of algorithmic
governance hinges on its ability to engage with and be responsive to public
input.166 For adherents of this view, algorithmic governance needs to afford
the same types of participatory mechanisms that have been integral to
governmental processes, particularly in the administrative realm.
B. Limits of Non-Power-Shifting Approaches
As consensus coalesces around the importance of public input, a few
jurisdictions have sought to mediate public participation in algorithmic
governance. All these approaches have transpired under a participatory
model of communal involvement that revolves around the ex-post
solicitation of public input from a variety of stakeholders in forms ranging
from stakeholder meetings167 to public hearings.168 This model of communal
163
Ric Simmons, Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1067, 1085–86 (2018); John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger
Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1803–05 (2018); Ngozi
Okidegbe, When They Hear Us: Race, Algorithms and the Practice of Criminal Law, 29 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 329, 334 (2020) (noting transparency as a key precondition for facilitating communal
participation in algorithmic governance); Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 61; Mailyn Fidler, Local
Police Surveillance and the Administrative Fourth Amendment, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 481,
560 (2020) (advocating for local input in policing technologies).
164
Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, 73.
165
See NOBLE, supra note 31, at 2 (discussing the problem that algorithmic systems are not neutral
and are designed with the sexist, racist, and classist ideas of their designers, in the context of algorithms
designed in the search engine context); Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided
Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364, 379 (2019)
(advocating for public input in algorithmic governance).
166
Requiring that the value-laden decisions around algorithmic governance be subject to public
debate and scrutiny may force developers and other technocrats to justify their decisions around
algorithmic systems, promoting accountability. See David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho,
Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 800, 846 (2020).
167
See PRANITA AMATYA, SHELBY KING, SHELBY MCNABB & HEIDI SCHULTHEIS, BAIL REFORM
IN CALIFORNIA (2017), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ash
x?DocumentFileKey=835f283a-e9fc-9c56-28bb-073a9bcb1dbf (providing an example of a process
dependent on stakeholder meetings)
168
See Stephanie Wykstra, Can Racial Bias Ever Be Removed From Criminal Justice Algorithms?,
PACIFIC STANDARD (July 12, 2018) [hereinafter Wykstra, Racial Bias], https://psmag.com/socialjustice/removing-racial-bias-from-the-algorithm (discussing the fact that the Pennsylvania Commission
on Sentencing held a public hearing around the use of a sentencing algorithm in Pennsylvania); NEW
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involvement takes inspiration from participatory processes utilized in the
administrative sphere. As Richard A. Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas have
explained, a cornerstone of the administrative approach to communal
participation is to allow “citizens [to] communicate their information and
views, but . . . the governmental decision-maker [has the] ultimate power to
balance the various inputs and make a final decision.”169
The problem with this approach is not communal exclusion. Rather,
members from these communities or relevant community groups are often
included as stakeholders at these sessions. The issue with this approach is
that the input problem is largely maintained by design. Pennsylvania’s
mediation of public participation with its sentencing algorithm is illustrative.
In 2010, Pennsylvania passed legislation requiring its Sentencing
Commission (the “Commission”) to develop a risk assessment instrument as
part of its strategy to reduce the state’s incarcerated population.170 When
resistance to this sentencing algorithm project gained momentum, the
Commission held a series of public hearings to solicit public feedback
around the algorithm’s construction to quell concerns.171 The process
included various stakeholders, including community groups representing
members from the most impacted communities.
The effort was hailed by many as an exemplary approach to mediating
public participation in algorithmic governance.172 However, key features of
this participatory process locked in place the input problem and its ensuing
consequences. First, the entire participatory process solicited ex-post input
around algorithmic governance. By situating public participation after the
approval of the use of algorithmic governance, the most impacted
communities were stripped of the power to take up first-order questions
about the nature and value of algorithmic governance itself in the sentencing
context.173 Second, the process placed exclusive control over the algorithm’s
inputs within the hands of the Commission. 174 This left little room for
YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, supra note 162, at 15–16 (contending that the
task force held a number of meetings with stakeholders around the use of automated decisions in the
public sector). But see AI NOW INST., CONFRONTING BLACK BOXES: A SHADOW REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEM TASK FORCE 14–16 (Rashida Richardson ed., 2019)
(criticizing the small number of stakeholders consulted by the New York City Automated Decision
Systems Task Force).
169
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1, 21 (2012).
170
The instrument was intended to aid judges in identifying low-risk offenders for alternative
sentencing programs. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2154.7 (2020).
171
Stephanie Wykstra, Just How Transparent Can a Criminal Justice Algorithm Be?, SLATE:
FUTURE TENSE (July 3, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/07/pennsylvaniacommission-on-sentencing-is-trying-to-make-its-algorithm-transparent.html.
172
Wykstra, Racial Bias, supra note 168.
173
See, e.g., Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 23, at 791–92 (noting how the most impacted
communities are excluded from first order questions about “how the state should provide safety and
security”) .
174
This problem is only compounded by the vulnerability of institutional stakeholders to capture.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L.
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members from the most impacted communities to contest and to resist the
use of inputs that would promote the over-incarceration of their community
members and resultingly threaten their community safety. For instance,
though community organizing drove the Commission to eventually abandon
the use of past arrests as a factor in the calculation of a risk score,175 the
Commission did not remove other proxies, such as past convictions, that
would unfairly inflate the risk scores of Black offenders.176 Since the
Commission had sole control and decision-making power over the risk
assessment tool, it had discretion to determine which recommendations it
would take on. This left the participatory process with no mechanism to
prioritize the feedback of Black Pennsylvanians, despite the fact that their
disproportionate rate of incarceration⎯which is approximately nine times
that of their white counterparts177⎯renders them uniquely vulnerable to the
sentencing algorithm’s outputs. These dynamics “reinscrib[ed] rather than
dismantl[ed] existing power imbalances[,]”178 enabling the Commission to
adopt a sentencing algorithm positioned to reproduce existing racial
disparities.179 Yet, disturbingly, despite the lack of communal control over
the algorithm’s purpose and design, the sentencing algorithm might benefit

REV. 15, 21 n.23 (2010) (describing capture as undue “responsiveness to the desires of the industry or
groups being regulated”).
175
Asli Bashir, Pennsylvania’s Misguided Sentencing Risk-Assessment Reform, REGUL. REV. (Nov.
5, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/11/05/bashir-pennsylvania-misguided-sentencing-riskassessment-reform/. It is important to note the fact that discriminatory effects of including of past arrests
as a factor in the algorithm was recognized by a few of the commissioners. For instance, Rachel Lopez
problematized and advocated to remove the use of arrests as an algorithmic factor during several
commission meetings. See, e.g., PA. COMM’N ON SENT’G, COMMISSION MEETING MINUTES: MAR. 3,
2016 5, 7 (2016), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/about-the-commission/meetings/meeting-minutes/prioryears/2016/march-2016/view.
176
Elizabeth Hardison, After Nearly a Decade, Pa. Sentencing Commission Adopts Risk Assessment
Tool over Objections of Critics, PA. CAPITAL-STAR (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.penncapitalstar.com/criminal-justice/after-nearly-a-decade-pa-sentencing-commission-adopts-risk-assessmenttool-over-objections-of-critics/.
177
See ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY
IN STATE PRISONS 7 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racial-andethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/(showing the racial disparity in rate of incarceration).
178
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 17, at 1610.
179
This problem was brought to the Commission’s attention by a 2019 independent assessment by
a Carnegie Mellon University research team. That report recommended that the sentencing algorithm’s
use be limited to low-risk defendants, after concluding that the sentencing algorithm only accurately
identified high-risk defendants forty-eight percent of the time and was particularly inaccurate in relation
to Black defendants. DAVID MITRE BECERRIL, CHRIS BELL, KATIE LEFEVRE, LAUREN LIN, WILSON MUI
& KARAN SHAH, VALIDATION AND ASSESSMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT
52–53 (2019), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/sentence-risk-assessment-instrument/sentence-riskassessment-research-archives/validation-and-assessment-of-pennsylvanias-risk-assessment-instrument.heinz-college-system-synthesis-project-may-22-2019-1/view. It should also be noted that the
Commission made small alterations to the sentencing algorithm in response to the Carnegie Mellon
report, but rejected the recommendation to use the tool for low-risk offenders. See PA.
COMM’N ON SENT’G, RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE: STAFF’S RESPONSE TO CARNEGIE MELLON
UNIVERSITY’S EXTERNAL REVIEW 2–3 (2019), http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/sentence-riskassessment-instrument/sentence-risk-assessment-research-archives/commission-response-to-externalreview/view
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from the illusion that its construction was the product of community
consultation, which, in turn, will facilitate its legitimation in the state.
The Pennsylvania experience illustrates the limits of redressing the input
problem by merely facilitating greater public participation in algorithmic
governance. By not facilitating the empowerment of members from the most
impacted communities, such processes will inevitably reinscribe existing
power imbalances that operate to undermine efforts by these communities to
resist or influence algorithmic governance. This state of affairs begs the
question of whether any efforts short of shifting power over algorithmic
governance could correct the input problem. For the reasons discussed
below, this Article suggests that while such efforts can ameliorate the first
layer of the input problem by facilitating communal involvement in
algorithmic construction, these efforts are unable to ameliorate the latter two
layers of the input problem, since they reproduce it.
To show this, the following section considers a series of approaches that
would center the participation of the most impacted communities without
endowing them with decision-making power. This kind of participation
would allow members from these communities to lodge their views about
algorithmic governance but would not endow these communities with a veto
regarding if and on what basis such governance would be pursued in the
pretrial system.
1. Focus Groups
The first option would mean holding focus groups comprised of
members from communities most impacted by incarceration. One possibility
in this vein would be for private companies to hold such focus groups as a
precondition in designing an algorithm for pretrial use. Procurement
contracts could require such a process. Beyond the recruitment and sampling
bias associated with the use of focus groups,180 the main problem is that this
approach endows private companies with the ultimate control and decisionmaking power over the algorithmic formula. Companies—rather than
members from these communities—would retain power to determine which
input to incorporate or disregard, leaving intact the two latter layers of the
input problem. To compound this issue, the focus group process can operate
to legitimatize the end algorithmic product under the guise of community
approval, even if all or most of the communal input was disregarded. For
this reason, this option would not fix the input problem.
2. Public Hearings
The second option would require the holding of public hearings solely
designed to obtain input from the most impacted communities. This would
differ from Pennsylvania’s approach since it would prioritize the feedback
180
See generally David L. Morgan, Why Things (Sometimes) Go Wrong in Focus Groups, 5
QUALITATIVE HEALTH RSCH. 516, 517–20 (1995) (noting the problems of focus groups).
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of the most-impacted communities rather than position the most-impacted
communities as merely one among many relevant stakeholders.181 Two
problems arise with this approach. One problem is the exacerbation of power
imbalances that already exist in these communities. Given that those
attending these hearings tend not to receive financial compensation or
reimbursement, participation would likely be skewed towards the most
financially stable and educated members in these communities to the
detriment of the most marginalized members. Furthermore, like the focus
group model, this option neither facilitates the incorporation of these
communities’ views into the algorithm nor would it afford them a mechanism
to resist the use of the algorithm itself. Both issues mean that adopting this
option would entrench the latter two layers of the input problem.
3. Appointed Citizen Boards
The third option would be to create appointed citizen boards where
community members could serve and provide input to the ultimate designer
of the algorithm. To create such a board, one might borrow from the policing
context, which has seen a rise in informal policing advisory citizen boards
that provide input on the practices and policies of police forces.182 A major
flaw with this approach is that there is no mechanism to contest the use of
the algorithm or to ensure their communal viewpoints around the
algorithm’s use and purpose are taken on. As such, this approach risks
regulating communal feedback to ex-post decisions around algorithmic
adoption, construction, and oversight, which, like Pennsylvania’s approach,
strips communities of involvement in first-order questions about the
algorithm’s design, purpose, and value.
These shortcomings illustrate how non-power-shifting approaches
maintain key consequences of the input problem. Even with these
shortcomings, the benefits of the participatory approach cannot be ignored.
This model is able to counteract the first layer of the input problem. One
promising feature of that counteraction is that this model could enable
members from oppressed communities to raise their viewpoints about
algorithmic governance. This might be empowering in that it might afford a
degree of accountability to these communities by incentivizing
decision-makers to justify their algorithmic system’s inputs and outputs.183
This process might influence decision-makers to make improvements to the
algorithmic systems used along the lines that these communities proffered,
181

This dynamic risks reproducing the Pennsylvania experience. For more information, see Section II.B
One example is the Community Relations Bureau’s Community Response Squad that advises
the Phoenix police force. See Community Response Squad, CITY PHOENIX, https://www.phoenix.gov/p
olice/community-relations/community-response-squad (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). For criticisms of
community police models, see Joseph Rukus, Mildred E. Warner & Xue Zhang, Community Policing:
Least Effective Where Need Is Greatest, 64 CRIME & DELINQ. 1858, 1858 (2018).
183
Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 169, at 23 (discussing how public input in the administrative
arena improves accountability “by obligating agencies to justify their actions publicly, ensuring that they
are ‘relatively informed and responsive to public needs’”).
182
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potentially decreasing these communities’ experience of pretrial detention.
Additionally, this model is politically palatable. If algorithmic governance
is inevitable, it may be worth it to seek approaches that partially redress the
input problem. This is especially true if more radical approaches to
challenging and redressing racialized pretrial incarceration, such as full
abolition, remain politically infeasible and the large-scale reduction of
pretrial detention, such as provided for in the New York Bail Reform Law,
does not guard against the continued use of risk assessment tools.184 On this
basis, counterintuitively, seeking at least inclusion in algorithmic
governance, even if it is not control, might serve to facilitate racial justice
alterations to the formulas behind the algorithms implicated in the
over-incarceration of racially marginalized defendants. Given these
potential benefits, it is conceded that the participatory model is preferable to
the status quo.
Yet, the major downside of the participatory model is that it largely
leaves intact the other ensuing consequences of the input problem, which
concern pretrial governance’s contribution to the democratic exclusion
experienced by racially marginalized communities both within and outside
of pretrial governance. The main reason for this result is that the
participatory model affords no lever for facilitating the incorporation of the
communal input solicited. Decision-makers are free to reject or incorporate
communal feedback as they wish, leaving these marginalized communities
without an avenue to reform or dismantle the pretrial algorithms that are
adversely affecting their daily lives. Moreover, this model risks skewing
outcomes towards the preferences of the most powerful stakeholders,
because, as K. Sabeel Rahman and Jocelyn Simonson note, “some
constituencies already possess greater capacity for power and influence”
than others.185 Any process for mediating public input that is not specifically
designed to counteract this operation of privilege guarantees amplifying the
voices of members from whiter and wealthier communities whilst muting
the voices of less privileged groups. For this reason, when applied to the
context of pretrial algorithmic governance, the participatory model risks
marginalizing or alienating members in the most impacted communities that
are opposed to all or key aspects of the algorithm project. The
materialization of either outcome means the reproduction and maintenance
of a large swath of the input problem. Given this, power-shifting, which is
discussed in the next section, remains the most viable approach to redressing
the input problem but poses a different series of concerns, which are
discussed in Part V.

184
185

New York Bail Reform Law, supra note 40, at 182, 184.
Rahman & Simonson, supra note 29, at 689–90.
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C. Power-Shifting Approach
The power-shifting approach is one that would shift power over all or at
least key aspects of pretrial algorithmic governance to the most impacted
communities. It is connected to a particular conceptualization of democratic
participation186 that has been theorized and advocated for in criminal law
scholarship and administrative scholarship, most recently by Jocelyn
Simonson and K. Sabeel Rahman.187 Its central contention is that substantive
or procedural policies alone cannot ameliorate or dismantle racial and
socioeconomic inequities unless those policies attend to the power imbalance
partially responsible for these inequities.188 From this starting point, it holds
that attending to power means shifting the allocation of power within
institutional structures toward the most marginalized members of society,
endowing them with direct power to “influence policy outcomes and control
the distribution of state resources.”189 This shift in power aims to provide
mechanisms to promote the democratic participation of vulnerable groups
that have traditionally been denied a share of decision-making power.190
The focus on redistribution of power is what differentiates this model
from the participatory model of communal involvement. It recognizes that
inclusion in governing structures without attending to the allocation of
power cannot materially reform or dismantle the status quo. Rather, such
inclusion serves only to reproduce and legitimate racialized systems that
maintain the subordination of oppressed communities. 191 For this reason, in
contrast to the participatory approach, the power-shifting model specifically
seeks to foster the participation of communities most impacted by the
carceral state. In so seeking, its design aims to counteract the marginalization
that these communities face within governing structures and within society
by centering these communities.
1. Potential Power-Shifting Scenarios
This Section sets out one scenario in which a power-shifting model of
communal involvement could be actualized in pretrial algorithmic
governance: bail commissions at the state and federal levels consisting of
186
CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 7 (2013) (“Conflict in
liberal democratic societies cannot and should not be eradicated, since the specificity of pluralistic
democracy is precisely the recognition and the legitimation of conflict. What liberal democratic politics
requires is that the others are not seen as enemies to be destroyed, but as adversaries whose ideas might
be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be questioned. To put it in another
way, what is important is that conflict does not take the form of an ‘antagonism’ (struggle between
enemies) but the form of ‘agonism’ (struggle between adversaries).”).
187
Rahman & Simonson, supra note 29, at 689–93; Rahman, supra note 140, at 318–19; .
188
MOUFFE, supra note 186, at 81.
189
Rahman & Simonson, supra note 29, at 692.
190
Id. at 689–92.
191
Simonson, Police Reform, supra note 23, at 807 (contending that layers of democratic exclusion
in the criminal legal system have facilitated the “reproducing and legitimizing an unequal and racialized
system of justice”).
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members from low-income, racially marginalized communities with the
principal task of determining if and on what basis pretrial algorithms are
used in the pretrial system. The scenario is premised on the creation of a new
institutional structure, the reason being that such a structure provides the most
promising avenue for effective power over pretrial algorithmic governance.
For this proposed institutional structure to have a prospect of
power- shifting, two conditions must be met: (1) the endowment of
decision-making power to the most impacted communities, and (2)
representation of the most impacted communities on the commission.192
i.

Decision-Making Power

Decision-making power must be exercisable by the most impacted
communities. This level of control is on a continuum, ranging from
exclusive non-reviewable control to control over only key aspects of the
adoption, implementation, and oversight of pretrial algorithms. At the very
least, power-shifting requires communities to have a mechanism to mandate
the incorporation of their viewpoints and values into algorithmic
governance. Having a mechanism means having control over the algorithm.
Merely allowing communal representatives to participate in or provide input
on algorithmic governance is insufficient. Within the spectrum, one vision
of power-shifting could be a commission consisting exclusively of members
from the most impacted communities tasked with administrating,
implementing, and overseeing pretrial algorithms, assuming that body
decides to pursue pretrial algorithmic governance. Under that vision,
technocrats—such as independent data scientists, developers, and
policymakers—may or may not have a role to play on the commission. Any
role that they may have would be subject to communal approval. On the
other side of the spectrum, however, another vision would be a commission
consisting of technocrats and community representatives with the primary
task of determining if and how pretrial algorithmic governance operates in
the jurisdiction. Under this vision, community representatives would only
have veto power over key aspects of pretrial algorithmic governance—
aspects that would have out-sized effects on their community’s safety. For
example, community representatives could have a veto power over the
adoption of pretrial algorithmic governance in the first instance and the
utilization of any input within the pretrial algorithm that would increase the
use of pretrial incarceration. Other decisions around pretrial algorithmic
governance could be decided by a simple majority. This latter vision would
lead to a blending of communal and technocratic expertise that could facilitate
the shaping of algorithmic governance to reflect communal needs and values.

192

Rahman & Simonson, supra note 29, at 682, 723.
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Composition of the Commission

Power-shifting requires a shift in who exercises decision-making power.
This means that representatives on the commission must be the Black people
living in the communities most affected by the use of pretrial algorithmic
governance. Yet, one difficult issue in implementing this approach is
defining eligibility. Who should be eligible for community representative
positions? Should eligibility be defined spatially, by self-identification, or
by experience? The difficulty is compounded by the fact that every person
whose body is ascribed with the racial category of Black experiences the
political, social, and economic consequences of pretrial incarceration, even
if indirectly. However, only some will have the experience required to
provide input approximating the needs of the most impacted. For this reason,
only those who live in low-income communities and have direct experience
with incarceration must hold these positions. This direct experience could
take the form of: (1) having been formerly incarcerated; (2) being the
immediate family member of a current or formerly incarcerated person; or
(3) being the direct victim of a crime. Three reasons justify this limitation.
First, these members tend to have the community expertise and community
connections needed to represent this constituency’s interest on a
commission. Second, allowing those without this experience threatens to
magnify power imbalances within Black communities, as those with more
privileged identities obscure the viewpoints of the most marginalized. Third,
because of the racial and economic segregation that persists in American
society,193 this prioritization of members from low-income communities will
also aid jurisdictions in determining the relevant community for the purposes
of the commission.194
iii.

Balancing Power Differentials If Technocrats Play a Role
in the Commission

If the power-shifting model adopted includes permanent positions for
technocrats, such as policymakers and developers, it would be important to
consider and redress the issue of power differentials. Power differentials
between technocrat commissioners and community commissioners prompt
the risk of co-optation and the fear that marginalized community
commissioners might be particularly susceptible to being influenced and
strong-armed by non-community commissioners. Promoting participation
193
Residential segregation remains high. See LAURA I APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME,
COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (2015) (arguing that “[i]ndividual communities in the United
States have tended to remain . . . segregated according to race, ethnicity, and class—therefore rendering
localized communities more homogeneous”). Also, it is possible to locate the most impacted
communities by focusing on most incarcerated zip codes. See, e.g., Caleb Gayle, Inside the “Most
Incarcerated” Zip Code in the Country, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 15, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/articl
e/155241/inside-most-incarcerated-zip-code-country.
194
For non-Black or non-racially marginalized groups, the determination of “the community” will
be more difficult. A future work in progress will engage with this problem.
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by non-commissioner community members (from the most impacted
communities) is one mode of offsetting this risk. Prior to determining the
formula of the algorithm, the commission could seek input through
stakeholder meetings, public hearings, or community canvassing. These
processes would serve to ensure that the commission operates in the interest
of the communities most impacted by incarceration and could also have the
added benefit of ensuring legitimacy and accountability to the community.
IV. THE POWER-SHIFTING MODEL’S POTENTIAL
If adopted in the pretrial algorithmic governance context, this model
could afford a potential resolution to the input problem since it would subject
first-order questions around pretrial algorithmic governance to communal
consideration and authorization. At the same time, it could engender other
benefits that are explored below.
A. Improvement of Algorithmic Inputs
Assuming pretrial algorithmic governance is pursued, this model could
improve the algorithms that are designed for the pretrial system since it
would enable algorithmic systems to benefit from the knowledge of the most
impacted communities. This potentiality engages with the Critical Race
Theory tradition,195 which is a scholarly and activist movement that seeks to
expose,196 challenge, and change the way in which race is constructed,197
deployed, and operationalized to maintain existing power structures. Critical
Race Theory supplies the theoretical framework to understand and remedy
how race and its intersection with other subordinated statuses198 operate to
privilege white identities over negatively racially marginalized people. I.
Bennett Capers has argued that Critical Race Theory provides the vantage
point for reckoning with how law constructs race and racial meaning.199 One
of its tenets is that sites of knowledge production and power have
195
It is difficult to define Critical Race Theory succinctly because of the various subgroups of
Critical Race Theory that exist. However, it is unified by a set of common questions regarding the power
of race and racism within and outside of legal structures. See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a
Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2248–49 (2017) (citations omitted).
196
Though invented, race is ascribed onto individual bodies by a process of racialization, in which
certain physical features are imbued with social significance. Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A
Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806–07 (1993) (“I have suggested in
some of my work in critical race theory that ‘race’ is a verb, that we are ‘raced’ through a constellation
of practices that construct and control racial subjectivities.”).
197
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of
Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1183 (2017) (“[R]ace is defined
just as much by stereotypes and the way one behaves in any particular moment and context as it is by the
way one looks, and by racially-associated ways of being such as how one dresses, how one styles her
hair, how one speaks, and how one votes.”).
198
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991).
199
I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 24 (2019).
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traditionally privileged white-identified groups, persons, and values to the
detriment of those ascribed non-white identities.200 To counter this problem,
Critical Race Theory promotes critical knowledge, embraces racially
marginalized people as knowledge producers, and emphasizes the
importance of their experiential knowledge in naming and remedying racial
injuries.201 Engaging with this concept, the power-shifting model promotes
the utilization of the experiential knowledge of those hailing from the
communities that have been most ravaged by the carceral state in the
construction, implementation, and oversight of pretrial algorithms, since
these groups have knowledge that could counteract and transform the racial
hegemonies inherent in the design of current algorithms. Because of their
experience with the criminal legal system, members from low-income
racially marginalized communities could utilize their unique expertise to
develop algorithms designed to mitigate the negative externalities associated
with the imposition of incarceration on low-income communities of color.
Working alone or alongside technocrats, racially marginalized groups could
name, disrupt, and dismantle assumptions that propagate these systems’
reproduction of the racial inequities present in the pretrial process.
The actualization of this potentiality could have a range of benefits.
Assuming there is a risk component to the algorithms designed, these
communities’ knowledge could improve this component’s predictive
accuracy, since these communities might have unique insights into the
factors that increase the likelihood of nonappearance and pretrial crime in
their neighborhoods—factors that may or may not be the same as factors that
are currently utilized. Moreover, communal knowledge could transform risk
assessment algorithms to algorithms that provide a more holistic weighing
of the risks and harms associated with the defendant’s detention before trial.
Having experienced firsthand the negative externalities that
over-incarceration has had on their communities, community representatives
may reject risk-only algorithms in favor of ones that also consider or only
consider harms that should count against a defendant’s incarceration before
trial. An example of such harm-based factors could be the fact that a
defendant is the primary caregiver for a minor child. The dual consideration
of harm and risk could be achieved by having the algorithm perform two
200
Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism:
Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65, 70 (2003).
201
Maria C. Malagon, Lindsay Perez Huber & Veronica N. Velez, Our Experiences, Our Methods:
Using Grounded Theory to Inform a Critical Race Theory Methodology, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 253,
257 (2009); EDWARD W. SAID, COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE HOW
WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD 157 (1997) (describing the notion of antithetical knowledge as a “kind
of knowledge produced by people who quite consciously consider themselves to be writing in opposition
to the prevailing orthodoxy”); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 9 (2001) (“Coexisting in somewhat uneasy tension with anti-essentialism, the voice-ofcolor thesis holds that because of their different histories and experiences with oppression, [B]lack,
Indian, Asian, and Latino/a writers and thinkers may be able to communicate to their white counterparts
matters that the whites are unlikely to know. Minority status, in other words, brings with it a presumed
competence to speak about race and racism.”).
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different assessments, one being a risk assessment and the other being a
harm assessment. Because these communities are adversely affected by the
over-incarceration of their community members as well as by the release of
“high risk” defendants before trial, their control over pretrial algorithmic
governance could facilitate the creation of algorithms that account for the
full extent of the costs and benefits associated with detaining a defendant
before trial.
B. Democratization of Pretrial Governance for the Most Impacted
Communities
The power-shifting model offers an opportunity to democratize pretrial
governance for the most impacted communities. By endowing members from
the most impacted communities with the control to resist pretrial algorithmic
governance, this model enables communities to voice their opposition to the
algorithm project and to an iteration of the pretrial system that is centered on
the incarceration of defendants without consideration of the harms that
incarceration poses to their communities. Their rejection of this form of
governance, if so done, could be read as their resistance to the current status
quo and as a desire to prevent the lock-in of the current pretrial system.
At the same time, the power-shifting model could lead to the adoption
of an iteration of pretrial algorithmic governance that centers on the most
impacted communities, which presents additional democratizing potential.
Though traditionally conceptualized as an anti-democratic and technocratic
space, this infrastructure controlled by these communities could be
transformed into a site that is democratic or even pluralistic, redressing the
exclusion and political ostracization that these communities have
experienced in pretrial governance.202 Under this scenario, such an iteration
of pretrial algorithmic governance offers a promising platform for
low-income racially marginalized people to democratically participate and
influence the operation of a pretrial system that has historically muted their
voices and viewpoints. Because of how fundamental these algorithms are
becoming in the pretrial process and in bail policy,203 this model would
afford members from these communities a path to render bail judges and
other bail officials accountable to them and their notion of public safety.
Moreover, the model presents a “workaround” to the existing shortcomings
of electoral politics that have tended to amplify powerful voices. This would
force the majority to hear and contend with the conditions that have
promoted the crisis of racialized pretrial incarceration as understood by
those inflicted by it. This power-shifting may or may not change outcomes,
but it still matters because it has the potential to promote the accountability
202
Rahman, supra note 140, at 335; Eaglin, Constructing, supra note 3, at 66; Collins, supra note
3, at 66, 107–10.
203
Roberts, Digitizing, supra note 16, at 1716.
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and legitimacy of the pretrial system to communities that have traditionally
been estranged from it. Beyond pretrial incarceration, if replicated in other
parts of the criminal legal system, such a shift of power over algorithms may
secure a level of democratic engagement, on the part of the most vulnerable
members of society, on a scale that has been unachievable to date.
V. SOME DOUBTS
The power-shifting model could provide a complete redress of the input
problem, yet, resultingly, would give rise to objections on the part of
algorithm reformers and community advocates. Using pretrial algorithms
controlled by the most impacted communities is not a politically palatable
or easily implementable solution, since its operationalization is subject to
buy-in by communities disproportionately impacted by incarceration,
algorithm reformers, bail judges, and the public. The following section
elaborates on the difficulties associated with achieving this buy-in, which
itself is emblematic of the tension between resolving the input problem on
the one hand and the aims of algorithmic governance on the other.
A. Algorithm Reformers Side
1. Dangers of Democratizing Criminal Law Objection
A major objection to the power-shifting model on the part of algorithm
reformers would be that the model places unwarranted faith in the power of
communities most impacted by incarceration to transform pretrial
algorithms and, resultingly, move the pretrial system away from its carceral
and racially stratifying tendencies. A recent articulation of this objection has
been authored by John Rappaport. In his article, Some Doubts About
“Democratizing” Criminal Justice,204 he doubts that decarceration goals can
be achieved through increased lay participation in the criminal legal process,
and he instead warns that lay people hold views that are too punitive,
divisive, and ill-informed to promote a fairer and more lenient system.205
Democratization of criminal law, he contends, particularly if designed only
to empower racially marginalized people, risks further flaring racial tensions
and enlarging the carceral state.206 Rather than take this chance,
“democratizers” should advocate for evidence-based approaches “consistent
with democratic values,” which would yield a fairer criminal legal system.207
This Article’s articulation of the power-shifting model is not the form of
democratization at which Rappaport’s critique is primarily directed since
this model aims only to democratize pretrial algorithmic governance and not
204
John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV.
711, 759 (2020).
205
Id. at 720.
206
Id. at 808–09.
207
Id. at 810.
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the entire pretrial system. Nonetheless, his critique remains applicable
because the power-shifting model necessitates increased democratic
participation from a segment of the population⎯the most impacted
communities⎯in the pretrial system. His critique is largely not fatal to the
actualization of the model in theory. It is true that members of the Black
communities that have been most impacted by incarceration hold
heterogeneous and sometimes irreconcilable views about the criminal legal
process, which will lead to potentially contentious debates around if and how
an algorithm should operate in the pretrial context.209 However, this is not
unique to the most impacted communities. Academics, developers, and
technocrats also hold divergent views. The very fact that the pretrial
algorithms that are currently in existence are exclusively risk assessment
algorithms represent a particular view about the purpose of the pretrial
system⎯a view that is not shared by all. For example, Crystal Yang has
suggested the development of a pretrial algorithm designed to perform an
analysis that would inform bail judges about the advantages and
disadvantages associated with incarcerating a defendant before trial.210 Her
proposal neither promotes community control nor community input, but it
demonstrates that the debates about the kinds of algorithms that should be
employed in the pretrial system are not settled and will not necessarily be
settled if pretrial algorithmic governance remains in the hands of
technocrats. Moreover, there is no guarantee that power-shifting would lead
to the discontinuance of evidence-based practices or traditional experts;
rather, with the power-shifting model, the use of either would at most be
subject to community discretion and at a minimum be combined with
communal expertise.
Yet, Rappaport’s account remains important because it signals some of
the political backlash that may arise from shifting power to the most
impacted communities. This backlash will be particularly strong among
algorithm reformers since the democratization proposed in this Article is in
tension with their aims. For many algorithm reformers, part of the appeal of
this form of governance stems from its potential to offset the penal populism
that is partly responsible for overincarcerating practices, particularly among
elected judges.211 Under this framing, algorithmic governance is supposed
208
Rappaport’s critique is aimed at those promoting democratic participation by local communities
as the key to fixing the criminal legal system. See, e.g., Laura I Appleman, Local Democracy, Community
Adjudication, and Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413 (2017) (advocating for a more local and
democratic conception of criminal justice).
209
Although there is not unanimity among Black adults regarding the state of the criminal legal
system, the majority hold the view that the criminal legal system is less fair to Blacks than to whites. See
JULIANA MENASCE HOROWITZ, ANNA BROWN & KIANA COX, PEW RSCH. CTR., RACE IN AMERICA 2019
11–12 (2019), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/04/PewResearchCent
er_RaceStudy_FINAL-1.pdf.
210
Yang, supra note 2, at 1486–88.
211
See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 144 (discussing the role of penal populism in the advent of mass
incarceration); Jonathan Simon, Millennials and the New Penology: Will Generational Change in the
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to offer a powerful counter-majoritarian influence on bail judges’ decisionmaking around the use of pretrial incarceration.212 Opening up control over
pretrial algorithmic governance to the most impacted communities threatens
this aim by potentially transforming pretrial algorithmic systems into ones
that are more punitive, and, if relied upon by bail judges, might increase the
use of pretrial incarceration. Power-shifting does engender this risk. And it
does not suffice to counter this concern with the point that there is no evidence
that algorithms designed under the power-shifting model will be more
punitive. The perception alone threatens the actualization of the entire project.
At the same time, the power-shifting model provides no guarantee that
the pretrial algorithms derived under this model will be empirically derived
or a product of technocratic expertise, raising fears that the pretrial
algorithms produced under this model will be viewed as illegitimate by
algorithm reformers and potentially by society as a whole. On the flipside,
the fact that this model democratizes pretrial algorithmic governance
exclusively for the most impacted communities could jeopardize its political
palatability and democratic legitimacy in the eyes of wealthier and whiter
communities, who might protest being subjected to an algorithm produced
by a commission on which they have no representation. These concerns are
not hypothetical. Recent efforts to shift control over policing to local
communities, particularly low-income Black and Brown communities, have
been met with white backlash.213 If the policing context is any precursor,
overcoming these political and social obstacles may not be possible.
2. Inaccurate Algorithms Objection214
Another objection that will be raised is that the algorithms designed under
the power-shifting model will be “inaccurate.” Because the algorithms
developed under this model would be derived from communal expertise, the
fear will be that the assessments produced by these algorithms would not validly
predict a defendant’s pretrial risk. A version of this concern is discussed by
Sandra Mayson, who warns about attempts to redress algorithmic bias by
eliminating racially disparate inputs or altering the weights assigned to such

U.S. Facilitate the Triumph of Risk Rationality in Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RISK AND THE
REVOLT AGAINST UNCERTAINTY 319 (John Pratt & Jordan Anderson eds., 2020) (contextualizing the
national consensus around penalism in the 1970s and 1980s).
212
Wiseman, supra note 55, at 417.
213
Elie Mystal, The Inevitable Whitelash Against Racial Justice Has Started, NATION (Aug. 31,
2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/blake-white-people-backlash/; Reggie Jackson, The
Inevitability of a White Backlash to the George Floyd Protests, MILWAUKEE INDEP. (June 12, 2020),
http://www.milwaukeeindependent.com/featured/inevitability-white-backlash-george-floyd-protests/.
214
This Article uses the term “accuracy” in reference to whether the tool reliably predicts the
likelihood of flight or pretrial crime for racially marginalized defendants as compared to white
defendants. This issue is generally referred to in the computer literature as “validity” of the tool, but this
Article uses “accuracy” since such aligns with the common use of the word.
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inputs, without attending to empirical data about nonappearance or arrest for
pretrial crime, risk producing inaccurate algorithms.215
This objection will be hard to overcome due to the importance that
algorithm reformers place on accurate risk prediction. The idea that these
algorithmic systems’ risk predictions outperform their human counterparts
has been a major selling point used by algorithm reformers.216 One response
to this objection could be that currently employed algorithms are not
“accurate” since they produce invalid predictions in relation to racially
marginalized defendants. But, on a deeper level, this response fails to
grapple with the fact that the “inaccurate” objection is tied to the importance
that empirics plays in the algorithm project. The truth is that algorithms
solely derived from communal expertise or from a blending of communal
and technocratic expertise might not yield predictions that are as accurate of
nonappearance or pretrial crime as algorithms derived from an empirical
model. Moreover, such algorithms may not yield results that could be
defined as risk predictions. This only poses a problem if one presupposes
that the notion of accurate algorithms will remain tethered to a notion of
public safety that is exclusively concerned with the dangerousness that a
defendant’s release poses to society. A power-shifting model unlocks the
potential that algorithms designed within it might pursue a notion of public
safety that concerns the safety of the defendant, their family, and their
community, alongside society as a whole. Under this model of public safety,
accuracy looks different. That difference would be destabilizing both for the
algorithm project as well as the pretrial system itself, rendering it hard to
imagine the implementation of the power-shifting model.
3. Rebellion of Bail Judges Objection
The final objection on the algorithm reformer’s side will concern bail
judges: Implementing the power-shifting model might cause bail judges to
disregard the assessments produced by these algorithms. This concern is not
theoretical. There has already been a “rebellion” on the part of bail judges
when it comes to heeding the risk predictions of currently employed pretrial
algorithms. As Megan T. Stevenson and Jennifer L. Doleac have noted, the
influence that a defendant’s risk score has on judicial discretion decreases
the longer the risk assessment tool is used in the jurisdiction.217 Moreover,
these deviations tend to correlate around race and adversely affect racially
marginalized defendants. In a recent study on Kentucky bail decisions, Alex
215
See Mayson, Bias, supra note 3, at 2264–65 (noting that attempts to fix algorithmic
discrimination risk inaccurate algorithms).
216
See Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The Accuracy, Equity,
and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BIG DATA LAW 10
(Roland Vogl ed., 2021) (“Algorithms typically outperform human judgment in predicting many
outcomes, including recidivism.”).
217
Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans
31, 53 (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., Working Paper No. 12853, 2019).
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Albright found that bail judges were more likely to override the
recommended default for bail bonds (based on risk scores) and impose
harsher bond conditions on Black defendants in comparison to similarly
situated white defendants.218 Moreover, Jessica Eaglin’s work has shown
that sentencing judges are increasingly developing procedural rules to
restrict the use of algorithms, which may be foreshadowing for the bail
context.219 Given this climate, algorithms designed under the power-shifting
model may exacerbate this trend, particularly in the context of elected
judges, who may be primed to view their own assessments as more
democratically legitimate than those produced by these algorithms. Of
course, this risk may not materialize. Arguably, the fact that these algorithms
would be designed by community members may encourage judicial
compliance. Moreover, the rebellion of bail judges will not necessarily be
abated by the continuation of the current iteration of pretrial algorithmic
governance. However, the potential refusal of bail judges to rationalize their
decision-making along the lines of the assessments produced by algorithms
designed under the power-shifting model poses an important obstacle.
B. Community Side
On the other side, the power-shifting model may receive objections from
the most impacted communities, particularly from those who reject the
algorithm project. For those critics, increased reliance on algorithmic
decision-making, regardless of who controls the design, will inevitably
reproduce racial stratification. Sean Hill takes this position, contending that
risk assessment is inextricably tied to the production of racial tropes that
justify the over-detention of Black defendants.220 In support of his position,
he points to algorithms that are currently in existence.221 His critique is
emblematic of the “no-algorithm” position held by some members of the
most impacted communities, who resultingly prefer the abolition of the
entire pretrial system. Given how algorithmic decision-making has been
employed to date, this critique is not easy to dismiss.
Moreover, having an algorithm-based approach to pretrial detention
runs counter to the individualized assessment that has been championed by
some community organizations. Any algorithm-based approach implicates
the age-old debate about rules versus standards.222 In short, rules require a
218
See Alex Albright, If You Give a Judge a Risk Score: Evidence from Kentucky Bail Decisions,
85 OLIN CTR. L., ECON., & BUS. FELLOWS’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1 , 4 (2019) (There is “suggestive
evidence that judges interpret risk score levels differently based on defendant’s race.”),
https://thelittledataset.com/about_files/albright_judge_score.pdf.
219
Jessica M. Eaglin, Population Based Sentencing, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 353 (2021).
220
Hill, supra note 34.
221
Id.
222
This Article only engages in this important debate to the extent that algorithmic systems apply
a rule-based approach to decision-making. For more information about the rules versus standards debate,
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decision-maker to apply a specified outcome to a set of facts. Standards
require that a decision-maker perform an individualized assessment as to
how a policy should apply to a specific event.224 The preferability of either
approach is context-specific and subject to substantial scholarly debate.225
The fact that algorithms employ a rule-based approach may garner
opposition from those who strongly believe that a defendant’s release or
detention before trial should be subject to an individualized assessment. It is
true that one cost of adopting the power-shifting model is that a defendant
may not receive a purely individualized assessment at the bail stage since
their bail determination may, in part, be informed by the outcome of an
algorithmic system. As the actualization of the power-shifting model is
subject to buy-in by the most impacted communities, the no-algorithm
position presents an important barrier.
CONCLUSION
The growth of pretrial algorithmic governance presents a troubling
challenge for racial justice. Present-day algorithms use factors that entrench
racial stratification by promoting harmful stereotypes of Black criminality
and Black over-incarceration. By so doing, they operate to maintain the
structural disadvantage that denies full citizenship to members of
low-income Black communities in this country. As the debate around the
racial effects of pretrial algorithmic governance continues, more attention
must be paid to the input problem that this form of governance produces and
entrenches. By shedding light on this problem, the hope is that this Article
adds to conversations underway about the racial justice implications of the
algorithm project. Resolving the input problem is potentially realizable and
holds latent possibilities for democratization and perhaps the radical
reorientation of the pretrial system for the most impacted communities. Yet,
the realization of this model would be in direct conflict with the aims and
goals of algorithm reformers, rendering it politically impossible. Not only
should this result curb enthusiasm for the algorithm project, but it should
also cast doubt on the potential of resolving the racial effects of currently
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz eds., 1991); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
223
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
58 (1992) (explaining that “[a] legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in
a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker
to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere”).
224
Id. at 58–59 (explaining that “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation.
. . . Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the
circumstances”).
225
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 428–29 (1985) (explaining the
epistemological problems with the rules versus standards); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 953, 955, 957 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 559–68 (1992) (providing an economic analysis of rules and standards).
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employed algorithms by measures that do not position the most impacted
communities as the designers, implementers, stewards, and controllers of the
new technologies of today and tomorrow.

